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Foreword 
 
Helena Holopainen’s doctoral dissertation is a collection of essays focusing on 
important topics in corporate governance from various viewpoints. It presents models 
of project choice by adopting the incomplete contracts approach where the internal 
structure of the firms plays a significant role in determining the magnitude and 
character of investments as well as on how the benefits (or costs) from these 
investments are shared among independent stakeholders. The first essay examines 
human capital investments within firms by asking the question: How can the firm’s 
owners by choosing between a general technology and a specific technology best 
induce human capital investments when these are not directly contractible. There are 
two ways for the firm’s owner to protect the employee’s investments. The owner can 
either choose a general technology or give to employees a veto right on the 
technology choice. The focus is to ask when one form of protection is better than the 
other one. The second essay examines the question of how decision rights over the 
projects should be allocated between owners and managers. This essay allows for 
owners to make an initial choice of a business strategy. The business strategy gives a 
better payoff for good projects, but also reduces the owners’ ability to monitor the 
project choice of managers. Third essay highlights the divergence in the managers’ 
and owners’ preferences concerning project choices when studying the role and 
structure of the board when the board is responsible for three tasks: selection, 
monitoring and counseling of a successor as CEO. The question is to ask when the 
CEO should also be a board member and whether a former CEO ought to stay on the 
board after a new CEO has been selected. The essay addresses the question of what is 
the optimal composition of the board in these respects.  
 
This study is part of the research agenda carried out by the Research Unit of 
Economic Structures and Growth (RUESG). The aim of RUESG it to conduct 
theoretical and empirical research with respect to important issues in industrial 
economics, real option theory, game theory, organization theory, theory of financial 
systems as well as problems in labour markets, natural resources, taxation and time 
series econometrics.  
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I Introduction
1 General background
The characteristic feature of a large publicly owned company is the separation
of ownership and control whereby the dispersed shareholders delegate the
day-to-day management of the company to professional managers. While
this separation has obvious benefits, for instance, by allowing finance and
management to be undertaken by specialized entities, it also creates potential
for an agency conflict.1
For many, corporate governance is synonymous to solving the adverse se-
lection and the moral hazard problems associated with this agency relation-
ship: how to select the most able managers and to keep them accountable
to the shareholders (Tirole (2001)). This view of corporate governance as a
collection of means to primarily protect the interests of the shareholders is
perhaps best captured by the definition of Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737)
who specify corporate governance as the ways by which "suppliers of finance
to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment".
1Jensen and Meckling (1976) were among the first to formalize this idea in their classical
paper.
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In order to safeguard the interests of the shareholders and to promote
shareholder value, a lot of attention has been paid in the corporate gover-
nance literature on the role various measures such as hostile takeovers, large
shareholders, board of directors, and executive compensation contracts as
ways of controlling managerial discretion. This listing is by no means a com-
prehensive description of all the viewpoints and mechanisms analyzed in the
corporate governance literature.2 In what follows, I will briefly discuss each
of the preceding mechanisms concentrating, however, strictly on aspects that
are particularly relevant from the viewpoint of the essays of this dissertation.
After that, I turn to discuss the concept of shareholder value itself.
The hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts in the United States in the
1980s focused attention on the market for corporate control as a disciplinary
device on managers.3 Typically, takeovers tend to be value-increasing in the
sense that the combined market value of the acquiring and the acquired com-
pany usually rises. In their influential paper, Shleifer and Summers (1988)
argue that this takeover premia may not be the result of eﬃciency gains from
improved management but may, to a large extent, come from transfers from
other stakeholders (such as employees). In particular, hostile takeovers may
2For surveys on corporate governance, see Becht et al. (2002), Hart (1995), Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), and the first chapter in Tirole (2006). For a survey taking an international
perspective, see also Denis and McConnell (2003).
3For an interesting account on how the nature of the merger and acquisition wave
changed in the United States in the 1990s when internal governance mechanisms (such
as executive stock option plans and board of directors) replaced external ones (hostile
takeovers and leveraged buyouts) as the engine of corporate restructuring, see Holmström
and Kaplan (2001, 2003). For a recent survey reviewing the existing literature on takeovers,
see Burkart and Panunzi (2006).
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allow shareholders to breach implicit contracts that exist between employees
and the current management. An important conclusion of the small strand of
literature that has developed around this theme is that some takeovers may
be undesirable since, if a breach of trust through a takeover is anticipated,
the incentive of employees to acquire firm-specific human capital is impaired;
consequently, certain forms of takeover defences may actually be justified.4
Hostile takeovers function by concentrating ownership of the target firm
in the hands of a raider and, thereby, allow the raider to replace (or at least
control) the management. Takeovers are, however, a relatively rare event
even in the United States. An alternative, and a much more common way
to concentrate ownership is the firm to have at least one large shareholder.5
Although having one or few large shareholders may mitigate collective action
problems among the shareholders by creating a party interested in monitor-
ing the management, there are also potential costs to this mechanism. One
example of such cost is the destruction of managerial initiative to look for
new investment projects if the existence of a large shareholder increases the
likelihood that shareholders will interfere with the manager’s project choice.6
4For formalizations along these lines, see Chemla (2003), Knoeber (1986), Maug (1997),
and Schnitzer (1995).
5With the exception of the United States and the United Kingdom, large shareholdings
of some form are the norm elsewhere; for papers which investigate the identity of these
large owners as well as analyze the relationship between the legal rules and the degree of
ownership concentration and capital market development, see La Porta et al. (1997, 1998,
1999). For a political economy model of investor and employment protection, see Pagano
and Volpin (2005).
6Other examples of costs related to large shareholdings are reduced stock market liq-
uidity and expropriation of small shareholders (and potentially other claimholders such as
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In their paper, Burkart et al. (1997) show that, by determining the share-
holders’ incentives to monitor, the firm’s ownership structure (i.e., the degree
of ownership concentration) can function as a mechanism to control the over-
monitoring problem.7
In practise, the board of directors is the body to which the shareholders
delegate the duty to monitor the management and, especially, the chief exec-
utive oﬃcer (CEO). A typical complaint concerning boards is that they tend
to be "captured" by the management; that is, rather than controlling the
management boards are in eﬀect controlled by the management.8 Recently,
in the wake of corporate scandals like those of Enron and WorldCom, both
legislative and regulatory changes to enhance the independence of the board
frommanagerial influence have been taken. For instance in the United States,
examples of such actions are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the amendment of
the listing rules of New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ to require the
boards of listed firms to have majority of independent directors. However,
while the trend has been towards increasingly independent boards, the em-
pirical evidence on the eﬀects of board composition on corporate performance
creditors) by large shareholders; for a discussion of the latter two eﬀects, see Shleifer and
Vishny.
7For a paper arguing that dispersed ownership may simultaneously also deter sharehold-
ers from breaching implicit contracts, see Habib (1997); for papers that analyze how other
organizational factors such as corporate diversification or the type of information available
aﬀect the managerial incentives to gather information, see Rotemberg and Saloner (1994,
1995, 2000) and Stein (2002), respectively.
8Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) develop a model where good prior performance may
enable the CEO to "capture" the board by allowing him to exercise greater control over
director selection and, consequently, over board’s decisions whether to replace him.
4
is mixed. Although increased board independence seems to have a positive
(shareholder value enhancing) impact on particular corporate decisions (such
as CEO replacement and design of incentive schemes), no clear connection
has been found between board composition and the overall firm performance
(for a discussion on the mixed empirical results, see the survey by Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003)).
In addition of the trend towards greater board independence, another
two trends have been pronounced in corporate governance during the recent
years: increase in pay levels of top executives in large companies and more
frequent appointment of CEOs through external hiring instead of internal
promotions.9 There is now a line of literature that aims at reconciling these
two trends. Murphy and Zábojník (2004a, 2004b) relate the rise in executive
compensation and the change in appointment patterns to an increase in the
importance of general (as opposed to firm-specific) managerial knowledge
while Hermalin (2004) argues that these two trends are related to a greater
board diligence in monitoring.
While varied in terms of the mechanisms, much of the debate in the cor-
porate governance literature is about the ways to promote shareholder value
than about the concept itself.10 However, one of the central and still contro-
9There is a vast literature on design of executive compensation packages so as to align
managerial objectives with those of the shareholders. This literature is not reviewed here.
However, for more on this issue, see one of the surveys on corporate governance or the
excellent review of incentive provision by Prendergast (1999).
10Most of the literature also concentrates on the governance of firms that are investor-
owned. There is, however, a range of other ownership forms (such as cooperatives and
partnerships) where the owners’ relationship to the firm is dominantly characterized by
transaction other than that of supplier of finance; for more discussion of this subject, see
5
versial questions of corporate governance is whose interests should corporate
governance represent? As opposed to the Anglo-Saxon countries, in conti-
nental Europe and Japan firms are widely perceived to have obligations to
other stakeholders beyond the interests of the shareholders. In part, this is
also reflected on the institutional design most prominent example being the
German system of codetermination which entitles employee representatives
a fraction of the board seats on the supervisory board.11
That the shareholders should be the ones in control is typically justified
by referring to concepts of exit and voice; voice (ability to directly aﬀect
corporate decisions) should be given to the constituent of firm who can make
most eﬀective use of it and whose interests cannot be easily protected by other
means like exit options (see, e.g., Holmström (1999) and Zingales (1998)).
Both of these factors then favor allocating control to the shareholders who
are a highly homogeneous group (and, consequently, eﬀective users of voice
as Hansmann has convincingly argued in his work), and who as a collective
lack an exit option (i.e., the ability as a group to sell their shares). How-
ever, whether the interests of other stakeholders such as employees can be
protected by exit options, depends on factors like the underlying economic
environment. According to Tirole (2001), one of the reasons why share-
holder value is currently more controversial in continental Europe than in
the Anglo-Saxon countries is that, due to the diﬀerences in the underlying
economic environment and, especially, in the flexibility of labor market (in
Hansmann (1996, 1999)).
11The German corporations are governed by two-tier board system where the supervisory
board oversees (and approves the actions of) the management board; for a more detailed
discussion of the German governance system, see Gorton and Schmid (2004).
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terms of the employees’ ability to quickly find comparable-quality job after
layoﬀ), the interests of the employees are much less well-protected by exit
options in continental Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon countries.
In the essays of this thesis, I analyze issues related to the preceding
themes. There are two common aspects in all the essays. The first is the need
(or potential) for corporate restructuring; the second is how allocation of con-
trol within a firm is related to undertaking restructuring. The first essay of
the thesis builds upon the idea that, what means are appropriate to protect
the interests of the employees in context of restructuring, depends not only
on the institutional setting where the firm operates but also on the choices
made by the firm concerning its production technology. By taking an ap-
proach used in the breach of trust literature, I then analyze two mechanisms
(explicit stakeholder protection in the form of veto power and severance pay,
and the firm’s choice of production technology) to reconcile the interests of
the employees with those of the shareholders. In the second essay, I use the
idea that monitoring by the shareholders may reduce managerial initiative
to study how a bias in the shareholders’ monitoring ability in favor of the
current business strategy aﬀects the shareholders’ decision to allocate au-
thority to a manager and to restructure the firm’s current business strategy.
In the third essay, I study the interaction between the board of directors and
the retiring chief executive oﬃcer in hiring a new CEO; the question is to
which extent the shareholders are willing to involve the departing CEO in
decisions concerning his successor so as to balance the benefits from the old
CEO’s expertise against the costs that arise from his desire to protect access
to private benefits through distortion of the successor’s project choice.
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In the next section, before summarizing the content of the essays in more
detail, I will present a brief theoretical framework for each of the essays by
discussing important papers related to the essays.
2 Background of the essays
In this section, I briefly review papers most directly connected to the themes
analyzed in the essays of this dissertation. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to make justice to all related contributions. As a result, in what follows, I
do not provide a complete literature review; for a broader and more in-depth
analysis of the related literature, I encourage the reader to take a look at the
individual essays.
2.1 Stakeholder protection
When analyzing the feasibility and potential problems associated with replac-
ing shareholder value with a broader concept of stakeholding, Tirole (2001)
notes that one way of protecting employees from biased decision-making re-
sulting from undivided shareholder control is to make the claims of employ-
ees insensitive to biased decision-making through, for instance, exit options.
However, when the knowledge of employees is highly specific to a particu-
lar firm, exit options provide only limited protection to the employees since,
by definition, firm-specific skills are not valued equally by other employers.
Building upon this idea, Roberts and Van den Steen (2000) develop a model
where the protection of employee interests is made even more challenging
by the presence of contractual incompleteness which (further) restricts the
8
means available to induce the employees to invest in valuable firm-specific
human capital. Among other things, Roberts and Van den Steen then show
that, to induce the employees to invest in human capital, it may be in the
interest of profit-maximizing shareholders to voluntarily grant the employees
a role in the firm’s governance and that doing so becomes more attractive as
the human capital of the employees increases in importance.
In the first essay of my dissertation, I extend a framework used in Roberts
and Van den Steen to analyze how, in context of corporate restructuring,
choices made by the shareholders regarding the firm’s production technology
could function both as a substitute and also as a complement to forms of ex-
plicit stakeholder protection in safeguarding the investment incentives of the
employees. In particular, as opposed to Roberts and Van den Steen who con-
centrate on human capital investments aﬀected adversely by restructuring, I
construct a model where the shareholders are able to control through their
choice of production technology just how adversely subsequent restructuring
influences the value of employee skills.
2.2 Allocation of authority
Recently, the influential contribution by Aghion and Tirole (1997) has drawn
attention to an idea that a principal (e.g., shareholders) may benefit from
giving decision-making power to an agent (e.g., employees, managers). In
their paper, Aghion and Tirole show that delegating authority over a deci-
sion (such as the choice of investment project) to an agent fosters the agent’s
initiative but leads, from the viewpoint of the principal, to a loss of control
over the decision taken. Secondly, even if the principal holds the formal right
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to decide, the possibility for ex post asymmetric information may transfer
real authority (i.e., eﬀective control over the decisions) to a better informed
agent. Aghion and Tirole then study how factors like the principal’s over-
load may function as ways to transfer real power to an agent although the
principal holds the formal authority. In somewhat diﬀerent context, Burkart
et al. (1997) show that, in terms of restoring managerial initiative, dispersed
ownership structure may have similar eﬀect by reducing the incentives of
shareholders to monitor the manager and, consequently, to interfere with the
manager’s project choice.
In the second essay of this dissertation, I extend the framework of Aghion
and Tirole to study how the allocation of authority within the firm interacts
with the owners’ choice of business strategy when the ability of the owners
to monitor the project proposals of the manager is biased in favor of the
status quo strategy. In particular, I extend the model of Aghion and Tirole to
analyze how the biased monitoring ability of the owners aﬀects the allocation
of control within the firm, and what consequences the resulting allocation of
authority has on the decision of the owners to abandon the status quo business
strategy.
2.3 Tasks and structure of corporate board
One of the reasons why corporate governance has attracted an increasing
amount of attention in recent years is a series of corporate scandals that
have shaken the corporate landscape for instance in the United States (for a
longer listing and discussion of reasons behind the recent prominence of cor-
porate governance issues, see the survey by Becht et al.). These events have
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led to regulatory and legislative changes so as to enhance the independence
of board of directors. However, taking the viewpoint that boards have other
functions besides the task of monitoring the management, a strand of liter-
ature has developed emphasizing that governance reforms regarding board
structure should leave room for individual choice since insider-dominated
(i.e., less independent) boards may actually sometimes be in the interest of
the shareholders. Examples of work along these lines are Adams and Fer-
reira (2005), Gutiérrez-Urtiaga (2000), Harris and Raviv (2005), and Raheja
(2005).
The basic insight in this literature is that the ideal structure of the board
and the tasks of the board are interrelated. In particular, once the perspective
regarding the roles of the board is widened to also cover tasks like provision of
advice to the management, the shareholders may benefit from lessening the
independence of the board so as to induce corporate insiders (CEO, members
of top management team) to reveal (more of) their private information to
the board.
In the third essay of my dissertation, I take the approach that the board
has multiple tasks and study the role and structure of corporate board in
context of a CEO succession process. In particular, I analyze to which ex-
tent the shareholders are willing to involve the departing CEO in decisions
concerning his successor when, despite the fact of having important expertise
that improves the board’s ability to first find a fitting successor and then to
provide counseling to him, the departing CEO is simultaneously also eager to
interfere with the successor’s project choice so as to assure access to private
benefits.
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3 Summaries of the essays
In this section, I summarize the research questions and the main findings of
the essays of this dissertation.
3.1 Essay I: Stakeholder protection and technological
choice
The first essay analyzes two mechanisms (explicit stakeholder protection in
the form of veto power and severance pay, and the firm’s choice of production
technology) as a means to reconcile the interests of the employees with those
of the shareholders in context of corporate restructuring. The essay is based
on the idea that, whether formal stakeholder protection really matters in
term of counteracting the eﬀect of anticipated future restructuring on the
investment incentives of the employees, depends on whether the employees
expect their interests to diverge from those of the shareholders; this, in turn,
can be aﬀected (controlled) by the shareholders’ choice of how to initially
organize the production.
More specifically, the essay builds upon the idea that the shareholders
are able to choose between two initial production technologies, and that this
choice determines how flexibly employee human capital can be adapted to
new circumstances such as the arrival of a new production technology. When
the initial technological choice is highly inflexible (i.e., the value of employee
human capital is exclusively geared to the status quo production technology),
this essay argues that employee veto power over all technological changes
should be combined with severance pay so as to allow the shareholders to
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undertake value-enhancing changes in the initial production technology while
still simultaneously protecting the ex ante investment incentives of the em-
ployees. No such explicit protection is, however, needed if the shareholders,
at the price of higher investment costs, initially organize the production so
as to allow the human capital of the employees to be flexibly adapted to new
circumstances.
The main findings of the first essay are that, when the initial technolog-
ical choice is highly inflexible, the shareholders are indeed willing to forego
some restructuring opportunities by granting the employees a right of veto
over minor changes; the level of protection oﬀered, however, falls short of
the socially desirable one. Secondly, an increase in the probability that re-
structuring opportunities arise in the future makes it more attractive both
socially and from the viewpoint of the shareholders to initially build a flexible
organization. Thirdly, if (in order to implement restructuring) the consent of
employees has to be bought by using severance pay, the likelihood that the
shareholders initially adopt the flexible technology increases.
Taken together, the results of the model imply that the shareholders’
choice of how to initially organize the production depends not only on the
type of industry but also on the governance system where the firm operates.
In particular, technological choices may act not only as substitutes to certain
governance arrangements in protecting the interests of employees but also as
complements to system-wide governance provisions. In particular, as long as
rights granted by law (such as mandatory board representation) or a high
degree of unionization raise the ability of employees to push for concessions
in context of restructuring, attractiveness of flexible technologies may also
13
be increased by the presence of certain institutional factors.
3.2 Essay II: Monitoring ability, allocation of author-
ity, and choice of business strategy
The second essay analyzes how the allocation of authority within the firm
interacts with the owners’ choice of business strategy when the ability of the
owners to monitor the project proposals of the manager is biased in favor
of the status quo strategy . The key idea in the essay is that, although the
management of the firm could be changed so as to reflect the changes in the
business strategy, restructuring may not be undertaken by the owners if their
human capital is biased towards the current business strategy.
In particular, this essay argues that the owners’ lack of knowledge of
the new business strategy, as captured by their lower ability to monitor the
project proposals of the new business area’s management, may lead to sub-
optimal (i.e., non-total surplus maximizing) choice of strategy. This result
arises because, when making their strategy choice, the owners care not only
about how divergent the interests of the manager are from those of the own-
ers but also how often the owners have to rely on the manager’s potentially
divergent project proposal. As a result, the owners may fail to switch to a
new business strategy, even though more congruent managerial expertise is
available under this strategy, because of the value loss from having to trust
the project choice of the manager more often.
Interestingly, when the monitoring ability of the owners is biased in favor
of the status quo business strategy, it will aﬀect not only the choice of business
strategy but also the allocation of authority within the firm. In fact, these
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two elements are shown to be closely linked in the sense that the eﬀects of
the strategy change on the allocation of authority help to understand why
the strategy choice of the owners may exhibit ineﬃcient inertia. Especially,
when delegation has incentive eﬀects by inducing the manager to use his
expertise to gather information about potential projects, delegation turns out
to be more attractive under the new business strategy because the improved
managerial incentives are a way for the owners to try to compensate their own
reduced information gathering ability. This eﬀect, however, simultaneously
makes the owners hesitant to switch the strategy since it would involve a
more frequent loss of control over the project choice.
More generally, this essay shows that the degree of the managerial exper-
tise (in information gathering) positively aﬀects the willingness of the owners
to delegate only if the interests of the manager are suﬃciently aligned with
the owners’. More precisely, for low values of congruence, delegation is never
chosen; in the mid-range, the choice depends on whether the degree of the
managerial superiority in information gathering exceeds a certain threshold
while with high levels of interest alignment delegation is always chosen.
3.3 Essay III: Board structure and CEO succession
The third essay of the dissertation applies the idea of board as a multitasking
entity to analyze the implications of succession process for the ideal board
structure. The essay develops a model where the board is responsible for
three tasks. It is first responsible for selecting a successor to the incumbent
CEOwho is due to retire at a pre-specified date. Once the successor has taken
oﬃce, the board is in charge of monitoring the successor’s project choice and
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providing advice to the successor.
In this essay, there are two key ideas. First, the presence of the departing
CEO on the board, although facilitating the ability of the board both to find a
matching successor and then to counsel him, simultaneously also weakens the
ability of the board to restructure since the predecessor (either due to legacy
concerns or because of empire-building tendencies) uses the opportunity to
distort the successor’s project choice. Second, there are two ways for the
predecessor to aﬀect the successor’s project choice and the access to these
can be regulated by the shareholders through the beginning and the length
of the predecessor’s term on the board. In particular, if on the board before
his retirement, the predecessor is able to select a successor who shares his
biased project preferences while, if on the board after his retirement, the
predecessor is able to use the monitoring role of the board to interfere with
the successor’s project choice.
This then implies that, at which point (if at all) and for how long the
shareholders nominate the predecessor to the board, determines how much
the predecessor is able to distort the project choice and, consequently, to
which extent the shareholders are able to realize restructuring gains. How-
ever, the beginning and the length of the predecessor’s term simultaneously
also aﬀects the predecessor’s opportunity and incentives to raise the match of
and provide counseling to his successor. At each stage, the shareholders then
face a trade-oﬀ. An early (i.e., pre-retirement) nomination, while increasing
the predecessor’s incentives to raise the match of his successor, simultane-
ously also allows the predecessor to choose a successor who shares his biased
project preferences. A late (i.e., post-retirement) or a continued nomination,
16
although inducing the predecessor to advice his successor, simultaneously
also allows the predecessor to interfere with the successor’s project choice
through the monitoring function of the board.
Taken together, this paper suggests that the extent of restructuring gains,
the firm’s ability to hire good outside directors and the importance of board’s
advisory role aﬀect at which point and for how long the shareholders want
to nominate the predecessor to the board. Low restructuring gains (i.e.,
good firm performance) favor an early and prolonged nomination while high
restructuring gains, the availability of good outside directors and the low im-
portance of mentoring for the successor’s (and the firm’s) performance favor
either an independent board or an early but only a short-term nomination.
17
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II Stakeholder protection and technological
choice
Abstract
This paper argues that, by influencing the sensitivity of employee
human capital to restructuring, the type of production technology cho-
sen by the shareholders aﬀects their need to oﬀer explicit stakeholder
protection so as to counteract the eﬀect of anticipated future changes
on the investment incentives of the employees. Consequently, to pre-
serve investment incentives, initially organizing the production so as
to allow employee skills to be flexibly adapted to new circumstances
can substitute for explicit stakeholder protection such as right of veto
and severance pay. Furthermore, when certain stakeholder rights are
granted by law, this paper suggests that technological choice can be
used to ensure that these rights are exercised by employees with in-
terests close to the shareholders’.
JEL classification: G34; J50; M54.
Keywords: corporate governance, technological choice, stakeholders,
human capital, severance pay.
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1 Introduction
The operations of firms are shaped not only by individual corporate gover-
nance practises but also by system-wide governance arrangements. In con-
tinental European countries firms are widely perceived to have obligations
to other stakeholders beyond the interests of the shareholders; this is also
reflected on the institutional design. For example in Germany, the system
of codetermination entitles employee representatives a fraction of the board
seats on the supervisory board.1 However, a recent boardroom scandal (see
The Economist (2005a, 2005b)) has facilitated the demand for German firms
to be able to decide on the number of seats allocated to employees. Would
such a reform deprive the basis for eﬀective employee participation in man-
agement? In particular, if left to the voluntary initiative of the shareholders,
would the opportunity of the employees to aﬀect decisions on corporate re-
structuring (currently requiring the approval of the supervisory board) sig-
nificantly diminish?
This paper argues that the answer to these questions is not necessarily a
yes. When the human capital of the employees is important in production
but vulnerable to restructuring, this paper suggests that the shareholders
may well voluntarily grant the employees explicit protection (e.g., a right of
1The German corporations are governed by two-tier board system where the supervisory
board oversees (and approves the actions of) the management board. Under the German
law, in firms with 500 - 2000 employees, the employee representatives are entitled to one-
third of the supervisory board seats; in firms with over 2000 employees, the fraction rises
to half of the seats (for a more detailed discussion of the German governance system, see
Gorton and Schmid (2004)).
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veto) so as to counteract the eﬀect of anticipated future changes on the in-
vestment incentives of the employees. However, even more interestingly, this
paper argues that, by aﬀecting the sensitivity of human capital to restruc-
turing, the type of production technology chosen by the shareholders aﬀects
their need to oﬀer such explicit stakeholder protection. Consequently, this
paper suggests that not only may technological choices act as substitutes
to voluntary governance arrangements in protecting the value of employee
human capital but they may also function as complements to system-wide
governance provisions. That is, when employee interests are represented at
the firm level by law, technological choice can be used to ensure that these
rights are exercised by employees with interests close to the shareholders’.
These results are based on the idea that, whether explicit stakeholder pro-
tection, either imposed from outside or voluntarily adopted, really matters
(i.e., has real consequences on behaviour), depends on whether the parties
expect their interests to diverge in context of restructuring; this, in turn,
can be aﬀected (controlled) by the shareholders’ choice of how to organize
the production. More specifically, this paper builds on the idea that the
shareholders are able to choose between two initial production technologies,
and that this choice determines how flexibly employee human capital can be
adapted to new circumstances such as the arrival of a new production tech-
nology. When the initial technological choice is highly inflexible (i.e., the
value of employee human capital is exclusively geared to the status quo pro-
duction technology), the shareholders are willing to forego (so as to protect
the ex ante investment incentives of the employees) some restructuring op-
portunities by granting the employees a right of veto over minor technological
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changes. The level of protection oﬀered, however, falls short of the socially
desirable one which would require granting the employees veto-power over
all technological changes and then using severance pay to implement value-
enhancing switches in the production technology.
The preceding case is then contrasted with the alternative that, at the
price of a higher investment cost, the shareholders initially organize the pro-
duction so as to allow the human capital of the employees to be flexibly
adapted to new circumstances. Since the value of employee human capital
is no longer vulnerable to restructuring, in this case the initial technology
choice itself is enough to protect the interests and the investment incentives
of the employees.
Empirically, the results of this model imply that the shareholders’ choice
of how to initially organize the production depends not only on the type of
industry but also on the governance system where the firm operates. In par-
ticular, an increase in the probability that restructuring opportunities arise
in the future (which is typical to new, innovative and developing industries)
makes it more attractive both socially and from the viewpoint of the share-
holders to initially build a flexible organization. Even more interestingly, if
the employees are able to push for severance pay when feeling threatened
by restructuring, the likelihood of flexible technology being initially adopted
increases. As long as rights granted by law (such as mandatory board rep-
resentation) or a high degree of unionization raise the ability of employees
to push for this type of concessions, this result implies that, in case of in-
dustries with high restructuring likelihood, flexible technologies may be even
more attractive in the stakeholder-oriented governance systems of continental
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Europe (e.g., Germany and France) than in the Anglo-Saxon ones.2
This paper is connected to several strands of earlier theoretical literature.
I defer a more complete discussion of this literature until Section 6 and only
comment here on most direct linkages (however, on the interpretation of
the initial production technologies as the choice between line production
and advanced manufacturing technology, see the next section). In analyzing
employee involvement in governance, this paper is linked to that of Roberts
and Van den Steen (2000) who show that commitment to preserve the status
quo production technology may arise endogenously as an investor-chosen
response to the ex ante problem of how to induce an employee to invest in
human capital specific to certain technology.3 Here, however, it is argued
that it may be both privately and socially optimal not to develop such a
technology initially so as to avoid dealing with specific human capital later
on.
Secondly, this paper also departs from that of Roberts and Van den Steen
in analyzing the question of how the ex ante investment incentives of em-
ployees can be reconciled with the ability of the shareholders to implement
value-enhancing changes in the production technology when the human capi-
tal of employees is specific to a certain technology. In this respect, this paper
2In the case of Germany, see Gorton and Schmid (2004) for some empirical evidence on
the use of codetermination practice to resist restructuring; for works councils, see Vitols
(2004) and, especially, Grund (2003) who discusses the evidence that works councils help
employees to receive severance pay in restructuring.
3In context of asymmetric information, similar conclusion is also reached by Boyer and
Robert (1996). They show that, to induce an agent to invest in specific human capital,
it may sometimes be in the interest of the principal to let the agent to observe the signal
regarding an alternative project’s profitability and to recommend change.
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is connected to those of Chemla (2005), Maug (1997), and Schnitzer (1995)
who use the ”breach of trust” framework introduced by Shleifer & Sum-
mers (1988) to formulate a model of how to induce corporate managers to
invest in firm-specific knowledge while simultaneously allowing for eﬃciency-
enhancing restructuring (takeovers, project liquidation).4 Chemla concen-
trates on the role of a stakeholder’s bargaining power vis-a-vis an incumbent
manager and a potential acquirer while Maug and Schnitzer, respectively, fo-
cus on the design of takeover defences and the role of independent directors.
Here, however, the emphasis is on the importance of technological choice and
how it aﬀects the severeness of the preceding trade-oﬀ.
This paper is organized in the following way. The basic model is developed
in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, I analyze how initially choosing a flexible
or inflexible production technology, respectively, aﬀects the design of firm’s
governance structure and the adoption of new production technology. In
Section 5, I endogenize the technological choice to derive comparative static
results. Section 6 discusses the related theoretical literature more in detail.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. All the proofs are in Appendix.
2 The model
In this section, I set up the model so as to analyze the implications of two
alternative status quo technologies as well as severance pay for the restruc-
turing outcomes of a firm. To address these issues, I use a simple one-period
model which builds on Roberts and Van den Steen. I start by specifying the
4For a model along these lines, see also Knoeber (1986).
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production technologies available for the shareholders. After that, I charac-
terize how the proceeds from the production are shared between the share-
holders and the employees, and how this process depends on the governance
structure of the firm.
Production technology: consider a firm owned by risk-neutral shareholders
who can choose between two initial production technologies: one which is
called specific (or, alternatively, inflexible) and a second which is called gen-
eral (or flexible). Both technologies require that employees invest in costly,
non-verifiable human capital whose value is tied to the current firm; the in-
vestment is denoted by h while c(h) = 1
2
h2 captures the investment cost of
the employees. The employees are assumed to be risk-neutral and to have
zero initial wealth. For simplicity, the reservation utility of the employees is
normalized to zero.
Given that the employees invest in human capital, the output under the
initial production technology is
y =
½
αh, if the general production technology is chosen,
βh, if the specific production technology is chosen,
where 0 < α < β. Hence, for any given level of h, the specific production
technology is, at the outset, more productive than the general.
The initial production technologies could be interpreted as a choice be-
tween line production and advanced manufacturing technology with the spe-
cific production technology referring to line production and the general pro-
duction technology to advanced manufacturing technology. The initial pro-
ductivity diﬀerence could then capture the higher investment cost of ad-
vanced manufacturing technology (AMT), such as flexible manufacturing
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systems and CAD-CAM equipment, as compared to more traditional line
production (for a more complete listing of AMTs, see Colombo and Delmas-
tro (2002)). Line production is based on narrow and specialized tasks, strict
work rules and close supervision while advanced manufacturing methods, to
be operable, require complementary, innovative human resource management
practices such as extensive screening of new workers, team work, job rota-
tion and regular information sharing.5 Interestingly, Ichniowski et al. (1995)
link the costs of adopting these new innovative work systems to their limited
adoption in the American steel industry.6
After the initial production technology has been chosen and the employ-
ees have invested but before any production has taken place, a new production
technology, which is profitable ex post for the shareholders to adopt, arrives
with probability p ∈ (0, 1). A key idea here is that, if the general produc-
tion technology was initially chosen, the human capital of the employees can
flexibly be adapted to the new circumstances while, if the specific produc-
tion technology was chosen, the adoption of the new technology renders the
5An illustrative example of these complementarities is given by Milgrom and Roberts
(1995, p. 194): in the 1980s, General Motors spent billions of dollars on robotics but
did not adjust its organization otherwise; despite its state-of-the-art technology, General
Motors continued to make losses at unparalleled rates; for more on this complementarity
argument, see also Milgrom and Roberts (1990). For a detailed characterization of tradi-
tional and more innovative human resource management practices, see also Ichniowski et
al. (1995, 1997).
6Ichniowski et al. (1995) account for two potential sources of adoption costs: searching
for and gathering information about these practices and, in steel lines already operating,
overcoming employee resistance to new work practices that may threaten (line-specific)
skills and knowledge developed under the traditional system.
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previous human capital investment of the employees valueless. As a result,
if the new technology is adopted, the output is
y0 =
½
αh+ δ, if the general production technology was initially chosen,
δ, if the specific production technology was initially chosen.
One possible interpretation of the situation is that the new production tech-
nology increases the productivity of some physical assets under the control
of the shareholders; this increase in productivity is then captured by the
parameter δ.
To draw a parallel to the preceding discussion regarding line production
and advanced manufacturing technologies, note that, as Ichniowski et. al.
(1995) acknowledge, traditional line production with its specific and narrow
task description may involve major rigidities (sunk costs) in case of restruc-
turing since many skills and practices needed to run a particular production
line are highly specific to that line. The assumption that the skills developed
under the specific technology are highly vulnerable to changes in the status
quo organization is then in line with this observation.
I will next characterize how the employees can be motivated to invest in
human capital in this framework.
The output sharing rule: in terms of motivating the employees to invest in
human capital it is clear that, due to the non-verifiability of the investment,
the investment level of the employees cannot be contracted upon before the
investment is made. As the value of the investment is tied to the current
firm, neither does the external labor market provide protection and, hence,
motivation for the investment. Since the employees have no wealth, the
shareholders cannot either simply solve the investment problem by making
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the employees residual claimants and extracting the expected returns ex ante
through a lump sum transfer.7
The employees could nevertheless be induced to acquire at least some
human capital if, before the investment is made, the parties entered into a
long-term profit sharing agreement giving the employees a fraction of the
returns generated by their investment. However, I assume that the parties
cannot contract upon (the division of) the output before the investment is
made. Instead, following the approach taken by Roberts and Van den Steen,
I assume that the shareholders and the employees bargain over the output
after the investment has been made and the final production technology has
been chosen. In what follows, the nature of this bargaining process depends
on the governance structure of the firm which can be agreed upon before
the investment is made. Before going over the specifics of the governance
structure specifying the general provisions according to which future changes
are dealt with, I first describe how the bargaining process proceeds.
The bargaining game is modelled as a generalized Nash bargaining game
in which the employees’ bargaining power is denoted by q and the sharehold-
ers’ by (1 − q). A key feature in this bargaining process is the idea that, if
the specific production technology was initially chosen, the adoption of the
new technology eliminates the ability of the employees to negotiate a share
of the output because, under the new technology, their human capital adds
no value. That is, given q, the payoﬀ to the employees, w, w ≥ 0, is given
7The parties could potentially get around the wealth constraint problem by using a
debt contract; however, I assume that this option is ruled out for instance because of
credit constraints.
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by the solution to the following maximization problem:
w ≡
½
argmaxw (y − w)1−q wq, if the new technology is not adopted,
argmaxw (y0 − w − δ)1−q wq, if the new technology is adopted,
(1)
where the outside option of the employees is zero under all technologies while
the outside option of the shareholders depends on the technology choice; it
is equal to δ if the new technology is adopted and zero otherwise. These
diﬀerences in outside options then reflect the ideas that the employees’ human
capital is tied to the firm and that δ is something the shareholders can realize
even without access to the human capital of employees.
Solving (1) and then inserting w into (y − w) and (y0 − w), respectively,
results in the following payoﬀs for the employees and shareholders:
w =
½
qy, if the new technology is not adopted,
q (y0 − δ) , if the new technology is adopted, (2)
π =
½
(1− q) y, if the new technology is not adopted,
δ + (1− q) [y0 − δ] , if the new technology is adopted, (3)
where π refers to the payoﬀ of the shareholders. By inspecting (2), it is clear
that the payoﬀ of the employees depends both on their bargaining power,
q, and also on the choice of production technology. In particular, if the
specific production technology was initially chosen, the employees are able
to negotiate a positive payoﬀ only if the new technology is not adopted. To
ensure that a switch from the specific production technology to the new one
is attractive for the shareholders, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: δ > 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2.
In this model, assumption 1 will guarantee that, if the specific technology is
initially chosen, the new production technology is profitable for the share-
holders to adopt when it arrives (the role and implications of assumption 1
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are formally derived on page 18). Despite assumption 1, the shareholders
may, however, benefit from credibly committing not to adopt the new tech-
nology. The reasoning is as follows. If the employees anticipate that the
shareholders will switch to the new technology whenever it arrives, it will
reflect negatively in their ex ante investment incentives since the employees
take into account that they will be able to negotiate a positive payoﬀ only
with probability (1− p); i.e., in the case when no new technology arrives.
Consequently, a credible commitment not to change the specific technology
in the future may turn out to be valuable for the shareholders insofar as it
helps to avoid the adverse eﬀects on the investment incentives. I will next
discuss the measures available for the shareholders to establish such commit-
ment through the design of the governance structure of the firm.
Governance structure: in the beginning of the relationship, the shareholders
design the governance structure of the firm by taking into account that the
investment incentives of the employees are aﬀected both by their bargaining
power, q, and, given that the specific production technology was initially
chosen, whether the new technology is adopted.
Instead of taking the bargaining power of the employees as exogenously
given, I follow Roberts and Van den Steen and assume that q is the share-
holders’ choice variable; its chosen level will determine the bargaining power
of the employees in the ex post negotiations and, as a result, also their share
of the surplus.8
8According to Roberts and Van den Steen, one possibility is to assume that bargain-
ing takes place at the corporate board; then, at the beginning of the relationship, the
shareholders choose the fraction of the votes, q, on the board allocated to the employees.
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In addition to determining q, the shareholders specify in the beginning of
the relationship how (or by whom) the final production technology is chosen.
The shareholders have the following option at their disposal:
Assumption 2: the shareholders can credibly commit not to change the
specific production technology by giving the employees a right of veto over
technological changes.
If the employees are given the right of veto, they can prevent changes in the
initial specific production technology which will have a positive eﬀect on their
ex ante investment incentives. As a result, the shareholders may profit from
granting the employees a right to block future changes in the technology.9
Severance pay: while improving the investment incentives under the specific
production technology, the right of veto has the downside that the employ-
ees can use it to block any changes (including value-enhancing ones) that
threaten the value of their human capital. The shareholders can, however,
get around this problem by oﬀering the employees a severance pay, S, in
exchange for their veto (and q) after the new production technology has ar-
rived but before the final production technology is chosen. In this model,
the combination of veto power and severance pay creates a (second-best)
optimal governance structure in the sense that it allows the shareholders to
undertake value-enhancing changes in the initial specific technology without
9The approach to corporate governance taken here comes very close to that advocated
by Zingales (1998), who defines corporate governance as the set of rules that shape the ex
post bargaining over quasi-rents in a firm. This is much the situation we have here: the
relationship generates quasi-rents that have to be divided between the parties through ex
post bargaining.
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simultaneously diminishing the investment incentives of the employees.10 In
particular, the combination allows value-enhancing changes in the technology
without at the same time aggravating the initial underinvestment problem
characteristic to this type of incomplete contracts framework; therefore the
reference to second-best optimality.
Timing: taken together the timing of the events is as follows:
1. the shareholders choose the initial production technology and the gov-
ernance structure (q, and veto or no veto);
2. the employees invest in human capital;
3. a new production technology arrives with probability p;
4. if a veto was initially granted, a severance payment can be oﬀered by
the shareholders in exchange for the employees’ veto and q;
5. the final production technology is chosen;
6. if no severance payment was oﬀered and accepted, the parties bargain
over the output;
7. production takes place; output is realized and distributed.
10Note that severance pay fixed before human capital investments are made would not do
the trick since, in contrast to one agreed upon ex post, it cannot condition the payment on
the actual investment. To support the view that severance pay can, in fact, be determined
ex post (i.e., after the arrival of a shock), there is evidence that in Germany works councils
operating in individual firms help the employees to receive substantial severance pay in
connection with restructuring through ex post negotiation (see Grund (2003)).
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I will next turn to analyze how initially choosing general or specific produc-
tion technology, respectively, aﬀects the design of firm’s governance structure
and, subsequently, the adoption of the new technology. In all cases, the model
is solved by backwards induction.
3 General production technology
In this section, I analyze how initially choosing the general production tech-
nology aﬀects (the desirability of) adopting the new production technology.
Given that the general production technology is initially chosen, the hu-
man capital input of the employees can flexibly be adapted to new circum-
stances; as a result, the new technology is optimally adopted whenever it
arrives and the expected output is given by (αh+ pδ). Consequently, be-
cause of the knowledge that their human capital will definitively add value,
the employees know that, for any given q, they are able to bargain a fraction
q of αh. As a result, they will choose h so as to maximize
max
h
qαh− 1
2
h2,
h = qα.
As expected, the investment incentives of the employees are increasing in q
and α. The shareholders’ maximization problem, in turn, is given by
max
q
(1− q)αh+ pδ s.t. h = qα,
q =
1
2
.
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The investment level of the employees and the (expected) payoﬀs of the
parties are then simply
h =
1
2
α,
w =
1
8
α2,
π =
1
4
α2 + pδ.
I will now turn to study how the situation changes if specific production
technology is initially chosen.
4 Specific production technology
The preceding analysis of general production technology showed that, if it
is initially chosen, it is irrelevant from the viewpoint of the employees’ ex
ante investment incentives whether the new production technology is adopted
whenever it arrives. If the specific production technology is initially chosen,
this will no longer be the case. I will next analyze whether (and to what
extent) the shareholders are willing to voluntarily protect stakeholder inter-
ests by granting the employees a right of veto over changes in the initial
production technology.
4.1 Explicit stakeholder protection is not granted
At first, I will analyze the case where the specific technology is initially
chosen but the shareholders do not grant the employees a right of veto over
technological changes. I will start the analysis by taking assumption 1 as
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given. I will then check that under this condition the shareholders indeed
prefer to adopt the new technology whenever it arrives.
Since, according to assumption 1, the new production technology is prof-
itable ex post for the shareholders to adopt, they switch to it when it becomes
available. This, in turn, means that the human capital of the employees will
only be valuable when no new technology arrives; that is, with probability
(1− p). The expected output is given by [(1− p)βh+ pδ], and the employ-
ees are only able to negotiate a fraction q of βh with probability (1 − p).
Consequently, the employees invest so as to maximize
max
h
(1− p)qβh− 1
2
h2,
which gives
h = (1− p)qβ.
As expected, the investment incentives of the employees are decreasing in p.
The shareholders’ maximization problem, in turn, is given by
max
q
(1− p)(1− q)βh+ pδ s.t. h = (1− p)qβ,
bq = 1
2
.
The investment level of the employees and the (expected) payoﬀs of the
parties are then the following:
bh = 1
2
(1− p)β, (4)
bw = 1
8
(1− p)2β2,
bπ = 1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ. (5)
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Next, I need to check that the shareholders indeed always prefer to switch
to the new technology when it arrives. Formally, this requires that two
conditions are met. The first requirement is that, given bh, the shareholders’
payoﬀ from the switch is larger than their payoﬀ if the new technology is not
adopted:
(1− p) (1− bq) βbh+ pδ > (1− bq)βbh.
This can be rewritten as δ > (1− bq)βbh and solved to give the switching
criterion of the shareholders:
δ >
1
4
(1− p)β2.
Since 1
4
(1− p)β2 < 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2, this criterion is already fulfilled
by assumption 1. Second, I need to check that the employees, knowing the
shareholders’ switching criterion of δ > (1 − bq)βh, do not invest extra (i.e.,
h ≥ δ
(1−bq)β ) to deter the switching altogether.11 Clearly, for the employees
not to invest extra (i.e., h = 2δβ ), it must be true that the payoﬀ for them from
the extra investment is less than their payoﬀ from the regular investment:
δ − 2δ
2
β2
<
1
8
(1− p)2β2.
Solving this and taking into account assumption 1 gives a condition which
coincides with assumption 1:
δ >
1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2. (6)
11Such an extra investment case could be interpreted as one in which an employee
successfully ”entrenches” himself by a clever choice of investment policy; on this type of
management entrenchment, see Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
41
It is then clear that the shareholders prefer to adopt the new production
technology whenever it arrives. Notice that the shareholders may be tempted
to adopt the new technology too often (i.e., with δ too low). It would be
optimal to adopt the new technology only when δ > βbh which is equal to
δ > 1
2
(1− p)β2. However, when p ∈
¡
0, 1
5
¢
, this condition is larger than the
one given in (6).
I will next turn to the case where the specific production technology is
initially chosen and the shareholders grant the employees a right of veto over
subsequent technological changes.
4.2 Explicit stakeholder protection is granted
I will now analyze the case where the specific production technology is ini-
tially chosen and the shareholders grant the employees a right of veto over
subsequent technological changes.
When granted the right of veto, the employees will definitively use it to
block any changes in the status quo technology; this follows simply from the
nature of the initial technology and the vulnerability of the employees’ human
capital to any changes in it. As a result, the output will be βh, of which
the employees are able to bargain a fraction q. The employees’ maximization
problem is then given by
max
q
qβh− 1
2
h2,
h = qβ.
The shareholders, in turn, choose q so as to maximize
max
q
(1− q)βh s.t. h = qβ,
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which gives eq = 1
2
,
and eh = 1
2
β, (7)
ew = 1
8
β2,
eπ = 1
4
β2.
Comparing eh = 1
2
β in (7) to bh = 1
2
(1− p)β in (4), it is immediately clear
that the investment incentives of the employees are now higher for all p > 0.
Consequently, veto power has a positive eﬀect on the investment incentives
of the employees.
However, this positive eﬀect of strong stakeholder protection has to be
contrasted with its negative eﬀect on the shareholders’ ability to restruc-
ture. In particular, the employees will also use their veto power to block
value-enhancing changes in the technology. Interestingly, by oﬀering the em-
ployees severance pay, S, after the new technology has arrived in exchange
for their veto and eq, the shareholders can realize value—enhancing changes
in the production technology without compromising the ex ante investment
incentives of the employees.
To see this, note that the shareholders have to set the severance pay S at
S = eqβeh
for the employees to be willing to accept it.12 Given S = eqβeh, it is in the
interest of the shareholders to oﬀer severance pay to the employees and adopt
12It is assumed here that the shareholders are the ones making the severance pay oﬀer
to the employees. However, if the situation were reversed, it would be possible for the
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the new technology when
δ − S > (1− eq)βeh,
which reduces to
δ > βeh. (8)
Proposition 1 The new technology is adopted eﬃciently with severance pay
S = eqβeh.
Proposition 1 follows directly from the equation (8) which says that, with
severance pay S, the shareholders will switch to the new technology only
when the output under it is larger than the output under the status quo
technology.
Given severance pay S, the shareholders’ payoﬀ is modified to
eπ = ½14β2, when 14(1 +p1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 12β2,
1
4
β2 + p
¡
δ − 1
2
β2
¢
, when δ > 1
2
β2.
(9)
To find out to what extent the shareholders are voluntarily willing to protect
stakeholder interests, their payoﬀ in (9) should then be compared with their
payoﬀ in (5). I will take up this issue in the next section.
employees to push the severance pay up to the level of
S = δ − (1− eq)βeh.
However, even in this case, the same switching rule as that given in (8) would result since
the employees would make the oﬀer when
δ − (1− eq)βeh > eqβeh.
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4.3 The choice of governance structure
Given that the specific production technology is initially chosen, it is now
possible to derive the shareholders’ choice of the governance structure by
comparing their payoﬀs in (5) and (9):
Proposition 2 When 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
4
(2− p)β2, the share-
holders voluntarily protect stakeholder interests by granting the employees a
right of veto if p < p; otherwise, no veto is granted and, consequently, restruc-
turing is undertaken by the shareholders whenever an alternative technology
arrives.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 2 captures the key trade-oﬀ the shareholders face between pro-
viding ex ante investment incentives to the employees and guaranteeing the
firm’s long-term flexibility to change its production technology. When the
specific production technology is initially chosen, lack of explicit stakeholder
protection will lead to a lower level of human capital investments but will
preserve the flexibility of the shareholders to restructure. On the other hand,
granting the employees a veto enhances their investment incentives but allows
the adoption of new technology only if severance pay is paid. Balancing the
options then leads the shareholders to grant the employees a veto only when
δ is small enough (i.e., when it is never in the interest of the shareholders
to use severance pay anyway). For larger values of δ, the shareholders keep
the control rights to themselves so as to be able to restructure whenever an
opportunity arises. To link these results to our earlier discussion about line
production and advanced technology, note that, if interpreted in terms of
45
choice between these two types of technologies, the predictions of this model
fit to the empirical findings of Colombo and Delmastro who, by using data
on Italian manufacturing plants, show that line production increases organi-
zational inertia while advanced technologies favor organizational change.13
Taken together, the payoﬀs of the parties are for all p < p
w =
½1
8
β2, when 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
4
(2− p)β2,
1
8
(1− p)2β2, when δ > 1
4
(2− p)β2,
π =
½1
4
β2, when 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
4
(2− p)β2,
1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ, when δ > 1
4
(2− p)β2.
Proposition 2 indicates that there exists a conflict of interest between the pri-
vately and socially optimal governance structure. While combining employee
veto power with severance pay S would force the shareholders to internalize
the eﬀect of restructuring on the welfare of the employees, it is unfortunately
not in the private interest of the shareholders to use severance pay S because
the proceeds (from the improved investment incentives) would have to be
shared with the employees while the costs would be borne entirely by the
shareholders.
Corollary 3 The shareholders oﬀer too little employee protection.
Corollary 3 follows directly from the comparison of proposition 2 to the
behaviour of shareholders under the severance pay alternative in (9). As a
13Boyer and Moreaux (1995) construct a duopoly model to analyze the role of industry
characteristics such as market volatility and size in explaining the tendency of Japanese
firms to invest heavily in flexible technologies and, in somewhat related manner, find that
increased market volatility may favor the adoption of flexible technologies.
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result, although their ultimate technology choice will display some inertia,
the shareholders will restructure too often and without voluntarily resorting
to severance pay S.
In the next section, I turn to analyze under which circumstances the
shareholders prefer to choose general or specific production technology ini-
tially and how their choice is related to the total surplus maximizing one.
5 The choice of initial production technology
The shareholders’ choice of initial production technology is based on the
comparison between their payoﬀs under the specific and general production
technology, respectively:
π =
½1
4
β2, when 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
4
(2− p)β2,
1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ, when δ > 1
4
(2− p)β2,
(10)
π =
1
4
α2 + pδ for all δ >
1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2. (11)
Proposition 4 When p → 0, the shareholders commit to the specific pro-
duction technology for all δ. When p→ 1, the shareholders choose the more
flexible general production technology.
Proof. See the appendix.
The results of proposition 4 are very intuitive. When the probability that a
new technology arrives approaches zero, only the relative productivity of the
two initial technologies matters; the shareholders obviously choose the more
productive specific production technology. However, when p increases, both
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the short-run productivity and the long-term flexibility of the human capital
input matter. For high values of p, the shareholders then opt for the more
flexible general technology so as to avoid the trade-oﬀ between the ex ante
investment incentives and flexibility.
Proposition 4 then captures the key finding that, when p increases, choos-
ing the general production technology initially becomes more attractive for
the shareholders. Interestingly, the preferences of the shareholders also shift
towards choosing the general production technology initially if, to achieve re-
structuring, the consent of the employees has to be bought by oﬀering them
severance pay S:
Corollary 5 If the employees can push for severance pay when feeling threat-
ened by restructuring, the shareholders choose the specific production technol-
ogy less often.
Proof. See the appendix.
Consequently, corollary 5 suggests that, in a corporate governance system
with high level of employee voice, the general production technology can be
relatively more attractive, i.e., chosen more often. Intuitively, the choice of
the initial production technology in such an environment fundamentally af-
fects the terms under which restructuring can be undertaken by determining
how divergent the interests of the parties are in the face of change. While
choosing the specific production technology initially aggravates the conflict of
interest in context of restructuring, the general technology alleviates it. This
then implies that technological choice may act not only as a substitute to
explicit stakeholder protection in guarding the ex ante investment incentives
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of the employees but also as a complement to system-wide governance provi-
sions. In particular, if rights granted by law (such as codetermination) or a
high degree of unionization raise the ability of the employees to push for con-
cessions when feeling threatened by restructuring, general type of production
technology can be relatively more attractive in a stakeholder-oriented gover-
nance system like that in Germany than in a typical shareholder-dominated
Anglo-American governance system.14 This applies especially to times of
major economic transformation and/or to industries which are developing
and, hence, subject to greater uncertainty.
Finally, let us briefly characterize the total surplus maximizing technology
choice. Recall that, if the specific production technology is initially chosen,
total surplus is maximized by granting the employees a veto and then using
severance pay to realize value-enhancing new technologies. Total surplus
under this governance structure should then be compared with that under
the general production technology:
TSspecific =
½3
8
β2, when 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
2
β2,
3
8
β2 + p
¡
δ − 1
2
β2
¢
, when δ > 1
2
β2,
(12)
TSgeneral =
3
8
α2 + pδ for all δ >
1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2. (13)
Given the specific technology, a comparison of (12) to (13) reveals that, while
the severance pay removes the negative eﬀect of technological change on the
ex ante investment incentives, it does not, however, prevent the new tech-
nology from rendering these investments valueless. As a result, the general
14See footnote 2 for discussion on the ability of employees for example in Germany to
push for preceding type of concessions.
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production technology may well be the total surplus maximizing technology
choice.
Proposition 6 For all p > 0, it is possible to find α < β so that total surplus
is maximized by choosing the general production technology initially.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 6 then captures the idea that choosing the specific production
technology initially and insuring the employees against losing the value of
their human capital by using severance pay is the total surplus maximizing
solution only if the human capital thereby protected is productive enough.
6 Related literature
As mentioned in introduction, this paper is connected to several strands
of earlier theoretical literature. Instead of discussing some of this literature
anew, I urge the reader to look at introduction as here I intend to take up only
the literature not already discussed there (see also the section titled as "The
Model" for discussion related to interpreting the initial technology choice as
that between line production and advanced manufacturing technology).
A central question in this paper is, whose interests should count in cor-
porate decision-making. Consequently, by touching the issue of allocation of
authority, this paper is connected to those of Aghion and Tirole (1997, 2001).
By arguing that technological choices made by the shareholders may impor-
tantly aﬀect how divergent the interests of employees are when faced with an
alternative project in future, this paper, however, diﬀers from Aghion and
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Tirole (1997) who in analyzing how the allocation of authority aﬀects the
incentives of employees to show initiative take the degree of interest align-
ment over the project choice as given. Simultaneously, this paper identifies
technological choice as a potential means to decrease the eﬀects of biased
decision-making which Aghion and Tirole (2001) acknowledge as a potential
downside of undivided shareholder control.15
By considering the eﬀects of firm’s technological choices, this paper is, in
turn, linked to the models of Almazan et al. (2003) and Saint-Paul (1992).
However, whereas Almazan et al. concentrate on investigating the interac-
tion between technological standards and the location decisions of firms, here
the focus is on the interaction between technological choices and the internal
governance structure of the firm. By looking at an organization with a dis-
tinct hierarchy and by considering how technological choices can be used to
control the amount of intra-firm frictions that arise in context of restructur-
ing, this paper also diﬀers from that of Saint-Paul where an entrepreneur may
choose a less specialized and, hence, less productive technology if financial
markets are underdeveloped.
In analyzing the role of severance pay as a means to overcome employee
resistance to restructuring, this work is connected to the recent paper of
Almazan and Suarez (2003), where diﬀerent combinations of severance pay,
incentive compensation and managerial entrenchment may emerge as opti-
mal depending on how noisy signal performance is of managerial eﬀort. In
15By considering explicit measures to protect stakeholder rights, this paper is also
connected to Cespa and Cestone (2004) where formal stakeholder protection, however,
serves an opposite purpose: to deprive the firm’s management of the possibility to self-
entrenchment.
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contrast to Almazan and Suarez, who concentrate on specific human capital
and connect the design of governance structure to pay-performance sensitiv-
ity, I argue that the design of governance structure (including the need to
pay severance pay) is intimately related to the type of human capital (in
particular, to its sensitivity to future restructuring) which can be controlled
by the firm’s choice of production technology.
By touching the issue of asset specificity and the resulting potential for a
hold-up problem, this paper is also linked to the seminal work of Williamson
(1985), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990). The latter
two papers are also relevant in the sense that the approach to contractual
incompleteness applied in this paper (i.e., some factors are assumed to be
noncontractible ex ante but contractible ex post) follows in their footstep.
More generally, there is an extensive literature both in organization the-
ory and corporate finance that examines the interaction between specific
human capital and corporate restructuring (for the "breach of trust" liter-
ature, see the introduction of this paper). For example, both Arya et al.
(2003) and Ferreira and Rezende (2005) provide motivation for why, to in-
duce firm-specific human capital, it may be beneficial for the management to
make early, less-informed investment decisions, or to publicly announce the
corporate strategy. Here, however, the emphasis is on the idea that to which
extent these type of measures are needed is aﬀected by the organizational
design.
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7 Concluding remarks
A central question in this paper is how the incentives of employees to acquire
valuable human capital can be reconciled with the ability of shareholders to
undertake value-enhancing restructuring. In this paper, the answer to this
question in terms of the need of the shareholders to use explicit stakeholder
protection (such as veto power and severance pay) depends crucially on the
sensitivity of employees’ human capital to changes in the status quo produc-
tion technology; this, in turn, can be controlled by the shareholders through
their choice of the initial production technology. This paper then suggests
that, when the human capital of employees is highly vulnerable to changes
in the status quo technology, employee veto power over technological changes
should be combined with severance pay so as to protect the investment in-
centives of employees; no such explicit protection is, however, needed if the
shareholders, at the price of higher investment costs, initially organize the
production so as to allow the human capital of the employees to be flexibly
adapted to new circumstances.
The main findings of this paper are that, when the initial technological
choice is highly inflexible (i.e., the value of employee human capital is ex-
clusively geared to the status quo production technology), the shareholders
are indeed willing to forego some restructuring opportunities by granting the
employees a right of veto; the level of protection oﬀered, however, falls short
of the socially desirable one. Secondly, an increase in the probability that
restructuring opportunities arise in the future makes it more attractive both
socially and from the viewpoint of the shareholders to initially build a flexible
organization. Thirdly, if (in order to implement restructuring) the consent of
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employees has to be bought by using severance pay, the likelihood that the
shareholders initially adopt the flexible technology increases.
Taken together, the results of this paper suggest that technological choices
may act as substitutes to certain governance arrangements in protecting the
interests of employees in context of restructuring. Furthermore, technological
choices may, under certain circumstances, also function as complements to
system-wide governance provisions. Addressing these questions empirically
would be an interesting avenue for future work.
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APPENDIX:
Proof of Proposition 2:
When 1
4
(1+
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
2
β2, the relevant comparison is betweeneπ = 1
4
β2 in (9) and bπ = 1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ in (5); obviously, the shareholders
grant the employees a veto only if their payoﬀ from doing so exceeds their
payoﬀ from not doing so:
1
4
β2 >
1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ,
which gives the condition
δ < 1
4
(2− p)β2. (A.1)
Combining (A.1) with the condition δ > 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 from as-
sumption 1 then gives the following condition:
1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ < 1
4
(2− p)β2,
which is non-empty when p < p ≡ (1 − 1
2
√
2) ≈ 0, 293. This then gives the
first part of proposition 2.
When δ > 1
2
β2, the shareholders’ choice is found by comparing eπ = 1
4
β2 +
p
¡
δ − 1
2
β2
¢
in (9) to bπ = 1
4
(1− p)2β2+ pδ in (5); naturally, the shareholders
are willing to grant the employees a veto and then use severance pay to buy
it back only if their payoﬀ from doing so exceeds their payoﬀ from not doing
so:
1
4
β2 + p
µ
δ − 1
2
β2
¶
>
1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ,
which can be rewritten as
1
4
(1− 2p)β2 + pδ > 1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ. (A.2)
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It is immediately clear that for all p > 0 the LHS of (A.2) cannot exceed the
RHS of (A.2). This then gives the second part of proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4:
To facilitate the understanding of this proof, I restate the equations (10)
and (11) from the body of the text and renumber them as (A.3) and (A.4),
respectively:
π =
½1
4
β2, when 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
4
(2− p)β2,
1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ, when δ > 1
4
(2− p)β2,
(A.3)
π = 1
4
α2 + pδ for all δ > 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2. (A.4)
When p → 0, (A.3) reduces to 1
4
β2 and (A.4) to 1
4
α2; the former is larger
than the latter for all 0 < α < β.
In the case of p→ 1, notice first that, when p > p ≡ (1− 1
2
√
2) ≈ 0, 293, the
region 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
4
(2 − p)β2 becomes empty. Conse-
quently, as p→ 1, the relevant comparison is between π = δ and π = 1
4
α2+δ;
the latter is larger than the former for all α > 0.
Proof of Corollary 5:
If, when the specific production technology is initially chosen, restructuring
can be implemented without resorting to severance pay, the relevant com-
parison of payoﬀs is between
π =
½1
4
β2, when 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
4
(2− p)β2,
1
4
(1− p)2β2 + pδ, when δ > 1
4
(2− p)β2,
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and
π =
1
4
α2 + pδ for all δ >
1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2.
The shareholders then choose the specific production technology initially
when p ∈
³
0,
h
1− αβ
i´
; notice that this condition is possible to satisfy with-
out violating the condition p < p ≡ (1− 1
2
√
2) ≈ 0, 293.
If, when the specific production technology is initially chosen, the sharehold-
ers have to buy the consent of the employees with severance pay in order to
restructure, the relevant comparison of payoﬀs is between
eπ = ½14β2, when 14(1 +p1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 12β2,
1
4
β2 + p
¡
δ − 1
2
β2
¢
, when δ > 1
2
β2,
and
π =
1
4
α2 + pδ ∀ δ > 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2.
The shareholders then choose the specific production technology initially
when p ∈
³
0, 1
2
h
1− α2β2
i´
. Since 1
2
h
1− α2β2
i
<
³
1− αβ
´
for all α < β, the
range of p-values for which the shareholders now choose the specific produc-
tion technology decreases; this then implies corollary 5.
Proof of Proposition 6:
When 1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2 < δ ≤ 1
2
β2,
TSgeneral > TSspecific requires that α >
r
β2 − 4
3
p× 2δ;
when δ > 1
2
β2,
TSgeneral > TSspecific requires that α >
r
β2 − 4
3
pβ2.
57
The relevant condition then is
α > max
(
0,
r
β2 − 4
3
p× 2δ
)
, where δ ∈
µ
1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2, 1
2
β2
¸
.
This can be rewritten as
α > max
(
0,
r
β2 − 8
3
pδ
)
(A.5)
where δ ∈
³
1
4
(1 +
p
1− (1− p)2)β2, 1
2
β2
i
. Looking at (A.5), it is then clear
that, for all p > 0, it is possible to find α < β so that TSgeneral > TSspecific.
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III Monitoring ability, allocation of authority,
and choice of business strategy
Abstract
This paper studies how the allocation of authority within the firm in-
teracts with the owners’ choice of business strategy when the ability of
the owners to monitor the project proposals of the manager is biased
in favor of the status quo strategy. It is shown that, when delegation
induces the manager to use his expertise in finding a project, delega-
tion is more attractive under the new strategy because the bias in the
owners’ monitoring ability raises the opportunity costs of not delegat-
ing. However, this same eﬀect may simultaneously cause ineﬃcient
inertia as the expectation of having to trust the managerial advice
more often prevents the owners from adopting the new strategy.
JEL Classification: G32; G34; L21.
Keywords: monitoring, allocation of authority, congruence, choice of
business strategy, inertia.
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1 Introduction
There is empirical evidence from transition economies suggesting that, to
achieve restructuring, it does not simply suﬃce to give monetary incentives
to the old management but new managerial human capital is needed (see
Barberis et al. (1996)). Even more interesting is, however, the evidence
indicating that restructuring may require a change in the human capital of the
owners. In the study of Barberis et al., when coupled with new management,
new ownership sharply raises the likelihood of restructuring.1
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical model to explain why
the human capital of the owners matters for the restructuring of the firm’s
business strategy. The key idea in this paper is that, although the manage-
ment of the firm could be changed so as to reflect the changes in the business
strategy, restructuring may not be undertaken by the owners if their human
capital is biased towards the current business strategy.
In particular, the owners’ lack of knowledge of the new business strategy,
as captured by their lower ability to monitor the project proposals of the new
business area’s management, may lead to suboptimal (i.e., non-total surplus
maximizing) choice of strategy. This result arises because, when making
their strategy choice, the owners care not only about the degree of agency
costs (i.e., how divergent the interests of the manager are from those of the
owners) but also the frequency of these costs (i.e., how often the owners have
to rely on the manager’s potentially divergent project proposal). As a result,
1In general, the privatization process in the transition economies has generated plenty
of empirical evidence on restructuring; Djankov and Murrell (2002) oﬀer a comprehensive,
recent survey of this literature.
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the owners may fail to switch to a new business strategy, even though more
congruent managerial expertise is available under this strategy, because of
the value loss from having to trust the project choice of the manager more
often.2
Interestingly, when the monitoring ability of the owners is biased in favor
of the status quo business strategy, it will aﬀect not only the choice of business
strategy but also the allocation of authority within the firm. In fact, these
two elements are shown to be closely linked in the sense that the eﬀects of
the strategy change on the allocation of authority help to understand why
the strategy choice of the owners may exhibit ineﬃcient inertia. Especially,
when delegation has incentive eﬀects by inducing the manager to use his
expertise to gather information about potential projects, delegation turns out
to be more attractive under the new business strategy because the improved
managerial incentives are a way for the owners to try to compensate their own
reduced information gathering ability. This eﬀect, however, simultaneously
makes the owners hesitant to switch the strategy since it would involve a
more frequent loss of control over the project choice.3
2The idea that a switch in the business strategy increases the informational asymmetry
from the point of view of the owners is somewhat parallel to the concept of mean-preserving
spread which puts more weight on the tails of a distribution for a given mean. In a sense,
the change in the business strategy comes close to this kind of a modification and makes
the project choice more risky for the owners.
3Here the informational advantage of the owners on one particular activity makes them
"conservative" and reluctant to abandon that activity. This idea is similar to that in
Minetti (2005) where informed finance can be an obstacle to technological progress; to
preserve the value of its information on mature technologies, it does not finance new
technologies (see also Guiso (1998)).
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More generally, the degree of the managerial expertise (in information
gathering) is shown to positively aﬀect the willingness of the owners to del-
egate only if the interests of the manager are suﬃciently aligned with the
owners’. More precisely, for low values of congruence, delegation is never
chosen; in the mid-range, the choice depends on whether the degree of the
managerial superiority in information gathering exceeds a certain threshold
while with high levels of interest alignment delegation is always chosen.4
In focusing on the role of the human capital of the owners, this paper dif-
fers from that of Mailath et al. (2004) where the ineﬃciency in the business
strategy choice results from the fact that the human capital of the man-
ager is tied to the current strategy; that is, a strategy change (in specific,
a merger) is not undertaken by a firm because it would make the provision
of managerial incentives more costly. By showing that the owners may not
restructure although informed about alternative strategies, this paper also
diﬀers from that of Inderst and Mueller (2005) who study how a manager
can be induced to reveal information about strategy when disclosure may
lead to his dismissal. Simultaneously, in emphasizing the monitoring func-
tion of the owners, this paper is diﬀerent from those of Frydman et al. (1999,
2000) which, to explain the diﬀerences in the successfulness of restructuring,
stress the diﬀering abilities of diﬀerent owners to accept risk as well as the
diﬀering needs to (politically) justify their decisions.
The two theoretical papers most closely related to this one are Aghion and
4By concentrating on the role of managerial expertise, the viewpoint of this paper
is diﬀerent from those papers where a generalist manager (someone with broad and flat
knowledge) might be preferable to an expert with narrow and intimate knowledge (see
Ferreira & Sah (2002), Hart & Holmström (2002) and Hart & Moore (2005)).
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Tirole (1997) and, especially Aghion and Tirole (1995). The latter takes the
framework of real and formal authority developed in the former and applies it
to analyze the eﬀects of corporate growth (e.g., an increase in the scale of the
activities) to the extent of organizational integration. The main implication
of the analysis is that growth, by increasing the headquarter’s overload, may
lead to refocus on core competencies (i.e., on something the headquarter has
expertise in and, hence, can cheaply monitor) through, for example, spin-
oﬀs. While building on the framework of real vs. formal authority, this
paper diﬀers from those of Aghion and Tirole by analyzing the role of the
managerial expertise for the allocation of authority and by showing that the
(relatively) good monitoring ability of the principal on one particular business
activity may lead to ineﬃcient status quo dependence when the private gains
from better monitoring ability in the status quo business activity overweigh
both the increase in the profits and the reduction in the degree of the agency
costs in the new business activity.
In addition to Aghion and Tirole, several other authors have also analyzed
extensively how diﬀerent organizational factors such as the degree of own-
ership concentration, the competition between business units over a limited
overall capital budget or the type of information available about the projects
aﬀect the information gathering incentives in hierarchies (see Burkart et al.
(1997), Rotemberg and Saloner (1994, 1995, 2000) and Stein (2002), respec-
tively). Similarly, possible explanations for organizational inertia have been
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studied both theoretically and empirically.5 However, none of these papers
analyze the ownership base of the firm as a source of inertia.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, I set up the model; in
Sections 3 to 5, I analyze the alternative allocations of authority under a
given business strategy. In Section 6, I endogenize the strategy choice of the
firm and examine under which conditions a change in the business strategy
will lead to a change in the allocation of authority; I then proceed to show
that the strategy choice of the owners may exhibit ineﬃcient inertia. Finally,
in Section 7, I conclude.
2 The model
Parties and business strategies: consider a firm, which is owned by risk-
neutral shareholders with perfectly aligned interests.6 The firm is run by a
manager, who is an expert of the status quo business strategy (what I mean
by managerial expertise will be explained in detail below). However, an alter-
native business strategy is also available and it could raise the firm’s profits
beyond what is achievable under the status quo one. This alternative strat-
egy could be the result of an exogenous change in the firm’s environment
(such as deregulation). Although the new business strategy is outside the
5For explanations arising from employee behaviour, see Ruckes and Rønde (2005) and
Schaefer (1998)); for an empirical study of the role of HRM practices and manufacturing
technologies, see Colombo and Delmastro (2002).
6Alternatively, there could be a controlling blockholder and a group of minority share-
holders with perfectly aligned interests holding the rest of the shares; the results of the
model are robust to this modification.
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area of expertise of the current manager, there is a new manager available
with appropriate expertise. As a result, the owners are faced with the choice
of continuing under the status quo strategy (with the guidance of the current
manager) or redirecting the business into the new business area (and replac-
ing the current manager). When making their choice, the owners will weigh
not only the potential profitability of the alternative strategies but also how
the degree of interest alignment and the owners’ own monitoring ability diﬀer
between the strategies. I will next discuss each of these factors in detail. In
what follows, both of the managers are assumed to be risk-neutral.
Projects: given the choice of business strategy, there are four alternative
projects which could be undertaken. At most one project can be imple-
mented; which project it is, cannot be contracted for ex ante. The project
payoﬀs are summarized in the following table where the first term in the
parentheses is the profit accruing to the owners, b > 0 is the private benefit
of the expert manager, −D < 0 and −l < 0 are large negative payoﬀs and
α, β ∈ (0, 1) is the congruence parameter (of common knowledge) measuring
the degree of interest alignment between the parties:7
7To reduce the amount of necessary parameters, I concentrate to the symmetrical case
where the parties have a common congruence parameter. The results of the model are,
however, robust to the removal of this assumption.
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owners’
preferred
project
manager’s
preferred
project
failure
project
zero
project
payoﬀs under
status quo
strategy
(1, αb) (α, b) (−D,−l) (0, 0)
payoﬀs under
new
strategy
(B, βb) (βB, b) (−D,−l) (0, 0)
Only three of the projects are relevant in the sense that they yield a non-
negative payoﬀ to both parties; neither party ever wants to undertake the
failure project. The zero project generates a zero payoﬀ to both parties while
the other two relevant projects diﬀer in terms of the payoﬀs they yield. One
of these projects is preferred by the owners while the other one is preferred
by the manager. The fact that the new business strategy is potentially more
profitable for the owners is then captured by the assumption that
Assumption 1: B > 1.
In what follows, I assume that, with respect to the project choice, all pos-
sibilities of aligning the interests of the parties by means of incentive pay
have already been exhausted (however, for more discussion on this issue, see
Section 7).
Screening technology: except for the zero project which is known, the other
projects cannot be distinguished from each other without further investiga-
tion. As a result, once the business strategy has been chosen, the parties
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simultaneously engage in information gathering to learn the project payoﬀs.
To simplify the analysis, the screening costs of the parties are assumed to be
zero (this assumption can, however, be removed at the expense of additional
notation).
The probability that the owners are able to identify the project payoﬀs
will depend on the choice of business strategy. In the status quo business
area, the owners are able to identify the projects with probability p ∈ (0, 1);
with probability (1− p) the owners still view the projects as identical. On
the other hand, if the owners decide to change the business strategy, the
ability of the owners to gather information decreases so that, under the new
strategy, the owners are informed about the project payoﬀs with probability
q, 0 < q < p.
The probability that the manager is informed depends on whether he puts
his expertise into the use. More precisely, after he has been hired but before
the screening takes place, the manager can take an unobservable action i
at a cost c. Taking the action i can be interpreted as a situation where the
manager exerts eﬀort to put his expertise into the use:
manager j’s probability of
being informed
in his area of expertise
action i taken
at cost c
p
¡
θj
¢
≡ p+ θj(1− p),
θj ∈ [0, 1],
j = old, new
no action i
taken
s,
0 < s < p
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The superscript j = old, new refers to the manager of the status quo and the
new business strategy, respectively. The parameter s captures the probability
that the manager is informed if he does not put his expertise into the use.8,9
One can then define the increase in the manager’s probability of finding a
positive value project, given that he puts his expertise into the use, as
∆jp ≡ p
¡
θj
¢
− s ∈
¡
θj(1− p), p+ θj(1− p)
¢
.
Here∆jp depends positively on the parameter θ
j, which is common knowledge
and can be interpreted as the degree of managerial expertise. When θj = 1,
the manager is able to identify the projects perfectly; for all θj < 1, there
is a positive probability that the manager views the projects identical even
after screening.
For now, I will treat θj as exogenously given and concentrate on the case
8For simplicity, the probability that the manager is able to identify the projects if he is
moved outside his area of expertise is assumed to be zero. However, even if this assumption
were relaxed (say, s would describe the probability of being informed in this case too), the
main conclusions of the model would remain intact. The only diﬀerence would be that in
the case of centralized decision-making (to be explained below) a change in the business
strategy would lead to replacement of the current manager only if α < β. In the existing
setup, replacement takes place always when business strategy is changed.
9Remark : to more clearly separate mere management changes from strategic changes,
the status quo option could be interpreted as a situation where only the management is
changed; the new strategy would then represent the combined eﬀect of new management
and new strategy. The empirical evidence, however, seems to suggest that management
changes often overlap with fundamental changes in strategy (see Inderst and Mueller
(2005) and the references therein). The evidence also indicates that diﬀerent owners are
equally able to identify, attract and hire competent management (on this, see Frydman et
al. (2000)).
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where equivalent expertise is also available in the new business area:
Assumption 2: θold = θnew ≡ θ and ∆jp ≡ ∆p.
Allocation of authority: after screening has been completed, the owners hold
the right to choose the project unless otherwise agreed. In practise, this
means that, after both parties have independently gathered information, the
manager makes a project proposal to the owners, who then perform monitor-
ing - i.e., pick their preferred project whenever they are informed about the
project payoﬀs.10 As a result, the manager will only be able to choose the
project when the owners are uninformed. I will call this case as centralized
decision-making.
Alternatively, the owners can choose to delegate decision-making author-
ity to the manager. In this case, whenever the manager is informed, the own-
ers rubberstamp his project proposal; hence, the owners’ preferred project
gets implemented only when the owners are informed but the manager is not.
I will call this case as delegated decision-making.11 The common element in
both of these authority structures is then the possibility for ex post asymmet-
ric information which transfers real authority to the better informed party
10Whether the information is hard (i.e., costlessly verifiable) or soft (a pure suggestion),
does not really matter because the parties do not have incentives to lie. That is, the
expected payoﬀ from randomly picking a project is suﬃciently low compared to the zero
project so that, when uninformed, both parties always prefer to confess their ignorance
while, when informed, both parties always propose their preferred project.
11Whichever authority structure is chosen, it is assumed that the owners can commit to
it either as a result of a specific contract or, more generally, through corporate charter or
law. For a recent paper which studies what decisions are delegated to a better informed
and biased agent when the ability of the principal to commit to any chosen allocation of
authority can vary, see Alonso and Matouschek (2005).
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(for more on real vs. formal authority, see Aghion and Tirole (1995, 1997)).
The owners choose the allocation of authority by taking into account that
Assumption 3: the cost c of exerting the managerial expertise is large
enough so that the expertise will not be used if the decision-making is cen-
tralized. Once the decision-making is delegated, the manager will use his
expertise.
As a result, ∆p ≡ p (θ) − s will capture the incentive gains from delegation
while α, β < 1 will capture the loss of control over the project choice.
Timeline of events: the events proceed as follows:
1. The owners choose the business strategy.
2. The owners hire an expert manager of the chosen business strategy and
choose the allocation of decision-making authority.
3. Depending on the allocation of authority, the manager either puts his
expertise into the use or doesn’t.
4. The parties screen the projects in the chosen business area.
5. The project is selected and implemented; payoﬀs realize.
This time sequence is chosen to simplify the analysis. However, the main
conclusions of the model regarding the attractiveness of delegation under the
new strategy and the possibility for ineﬃcient status quo bias are not condi-
tional on the owners’ strategy choice preceding the project screening stage.12
12Reversing the time sequence would involve hiring two managers instead of just one.
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While endogenizing the time sequence is outside the scope of this paper, it
is, however, worth noting that the owners’ decision whether to screen first is
likely to be aﬀected not only by intra-firm considerations but also by external
factors (such as (time) pressure created by competing firms). Consider, for
example, a situation where new markets open as a result of deregulation and
there is competition to enter from other potential entrants; then the time
lag from waiting the screening to be completed may well prevent firms from
screening before entry. As a result, the chosen time sequence can also be
justified by market conditions.
3 Delegated decision-making
The model is solved by backwards induction. Given delegated decision-
making, the action i has already been taken by the manager by the time
when screening takes place. As a result, the payoﬀs of the parties from
screening under the status quo business strategy are given by
πMD = p (θ) b+ (1− p (θ)) pαb− c, (1)
πOD = p (θ)α+ (1− p (θ)) p, (2)
The additional factors to be considered would then include i) the cost of monitoring two
managers (instead of just one), ii) the eﬀects on the probability that no positive value
project is found (with two managers this occurs only when neither of the managers nor
the owners are informed) and iii) the eﬀects on the managerial incentives when at most
one project can be implemented (with two managers there is the possibility that no project
will be implemented in the manager’s business area even though the manager is informed;
with one manager this additional complication does not arise).
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where the superscriptsM and O denote the manager and the owners, respec-
tively. Whenever the manager is informed (which happens with probability
p (θ)), he picks his preferred project with a private benefit of b to himself
and a profit α to the owners. When the manager is uninformed but the
owners are informed (which happens with probability (1− p (θ)) p), the own-
ers get to choose their preferred project with profit 1 to themselves and a
private benefit of αb to the manager. When neither party is informed, the
expected payoﬀ from randomly choosing a project is suﬃciently low so that
both parties prefer the zero project.
For the payoﬀs in (1) and (2) to realize, the following condition has to be
met:
πMD > sb+ (1− s) pαb. (3)
That is, the manager’s payoﬀ from taking the action i has to exceed his payoﬀ
of not taking it.13 From the equation (3) we get (after some rewriting) the
following condition for c:
c < 4p (1− pα) b. (4)
In contrast, if the new business strategy is chosen, the payoﬀs from delegation
are given by
rMD = p (θ) b+ (1− p (θ)) qβb− c,
rOD = p (θ)βB + (1− p (θ)) qB,
13Remark : when the screening costs are normalized to zero, both parties find it optimal
to screen independently of the authority structure. The condition (3) then guarantees
that the expert screens using his expertise. When g > 0, additional conditions have to be
met for both parties to screen independently of the authority structure. It is, however,
possible to find g > 0 for this to happen.
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where the condition
rMD > sb+ (1− s) qβb (5)
has to hold. Solving the equation (5) gives the following condition:
c < 4p (1− qβ) b. (6)
Together with (4), this condition then simply says that the cost of exercising
managerial expertise has to be low enough for expertise to be used whenever
delegation is chosen.
4 Centralized decision-making
When the decision-making is centralized, the manager is not willing to ex-
ert eﬀort to use his expertise. As a result, the payoﬀs of the parties from
screening in the status quo business area are given by
πMC = pαb+ (1− p) sb, (7)
πOC = p+ (1− p) sα. (8)
Whenever the owners are informed (which happens with probability p), they
pick their preferred project that generates a profit 1 to themselves and a
private benefit αb to the manager. When the owners are uninformed but the
manager is informed (which happens with probability (1−p)s), the manager
gets to choose his preferred project with private benefit b to himself and a
profit α to the owners.
For the payoﬀs in (7) and (8) to realize, the manager’s payoﬀ from not
taking the action i has to exceed his payoﬀ from taking it:
πMC > pαb+ (1− p) p (θ) b− c,
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which gives the following condition for c:
c > 4p (1− p) b. (9)
However, if the new business strategy is chosen, the payoﬀs under central-
ization are given by
rMC = qβb+ (1− q) sb,
rOC = qB + (1− q) sβB,
where
rMC > qβb+ (1− q) p (θ) b− c
has to hold. This then gives the following condition:
c > 4p (1− q) b. (10)
Lemma 1 The necessary condition for both the manager of the status quo
business strategy and the manager of the new strategy to exercise their ex-
pertise if delegated decision-making is chosen by the owners is
• 4p (1− q) b < c < 4p (1− pα) b, when α ≥ β and αp < q < p, or
when α < β and αp < q < αβp;
• 4p (1− q) b < c < 4p (1− qβ) b, when α < β and αβp < q < p.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 simply says that it is possible to find c > 0 so that the manager of
a given business strategy acts according to the assumption 3; i.e., puts his
expertise into the use only if authority is delegated to him.
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5 The choice of authority structure
Let’s first look at the owners’ choice of the authority structure given their
choice of the business strategy. Obviously, the owners will choose delegated
decision-making if and only if their profits under it are larger than their
profits with centralized decision-making:
πOD − πOC = p (θ) (α− p)− s (1− p)α > 0, (11)
rOD − rOC = [p (θ) (β − q)− s (1− q)β]B > 0. (12)
Proposition 2 The willingness of the owners to choose delegated decision
making depends
• positively on the congruence parameter under both business strategies;
• negatively on s;
• negatively on q under the new business strategy;
• positively on the degree of expertise, θ, under the status quo business
strategy if α > p, and similarly under the new business strategy if β > q;
the critical value of θ for delegation to dominate centralization is θ >
θold ≡ p
2−α[p−s(1−p)]
(1−p)(α−p) under the status quo business strategy and θ >
θnew ≡ pq−β[p−s(1−q)]
(1−p)(β−q) under the new business strategy.
The first three results are straightforward: the owners will choose delegation
more likely, when the interests of the parties are close to each other, when
the incentive gains from delegation are high and when their own ability to
identify the projects is low.
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The most interesting result of proposition 2 is the last one. First of all, it
tells us that, given α > p and β > q, delegation is more likely to take place
the more experienced and competent the expert is (i.e., the higher the core
competency parameter θ is).
Secondly, and more importantly, the degree of managerial expertise has
a positive impact on the willingness of the owners to delegate only if the
interests of the manager are suﬃciently congruent with the owners’ (i.e.,
only if α > p and β > q). As a result, even though θ were equal to one so
that the manager could perfectly identify the projects, the owners wouldn’t
necessarily want to delegate decision-making to him. The intuition for this
result is that the more competent the manager is the more able he also is to
steer the company to his preferred direction.
Thirdly, since q < p, the required threshold value for expertise to have a
positive impact on the willingness to delegate is lower under the new strategy.
This result simply captures the idea that delegation, and the subsequent use
of the managerial expertise, is a way for the owners to compensate their
own imperfect screening (i.e., a way to increase the probability of finding a
positive value project). As the imperfectness of their own screening increases,
this compensation eﬀect becomes more valuable for the owners lowering the
threshold level after which they are willing to consider delegation.
Fourthly, the critical values of θ for which delegation dominates central-
ization are decreasing with the congruence parameters:
¡
∂θold/∂α
¢
< 0 and
(∂θnew/∂β) < 0. This is also a very intuitive result. As long as a basic level
of congruence exists (i.e., α > p and β > q), the manager can compensate
an increase in the discongruence of interests by better expertise (i.e., higher
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θ) and still trust the decision-making to be delegated to him.
Finally, θold and θnew are positive and do not exceed one only if p
1−s(1−p) ≤
α < p2p−s(1−p) and
q
1−s(1−q) ≤ β <
qp
p−s(1−q) , respectively. It is then clear that:
Corollary 3 When α ∈
³
0, p
1−s(1−p)
´
and β ∈
³
0, q
1−s(1−q)
´
, delegation is
never chosen; when α ∈
h
p
1−s(1−p) ,
p2
p−s(1−p)
´
, and β ∈
h
q
1−s(1−q) ,
qp
p−s(1−q)
´
,
the manager has to possess a certain positive minimum amount of expertise
determined by θj, j = old, new, for the owners ever to choose delegation;
when α ∈
h
p2
p−s(1−p) , 1
´
and β ∈
h
qp
p−s(1−q) , 1
´
, delegation will be chosen for
all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
The first part of corollary 3 simply follows from the fact that, at low levels of
interest alignment, it is not possible to find θj ≤ 1 so that the owners would
choose delegation. However, when the value of the congruence parameter
belongs to the intermediate range, delegation will be chosen if the manager
has enough expertise. Finally, when the interests of the manager become
increasingly congruent with the owners’, even small positive incentive eﬀects
from delegation are likely to dominate the costs from slightly discongruent
decisions. As a result, it is in the interest of the owners to choose delegation
even when θ approaches zero.14
14Remark : to understand this result, it is important to remember that the parameter
θ ∈ [0, 1] determines, first of all, how much more superior the manager is in finding a
positive value project: p (θ)− p ∈ [0, 1− p] , p (θ)− q ∈ [p− q, 1− q] in the status quo and
the new business area, respectively. Secondly, it determines the magnitude of managerial
incentive eﬀects from delegation: p (θ)−s ∈ [p− s, 1− s]. This latter eﬀect is independent
of the choice of business strategy. When θ approaches 0, (p (θ)− p) approaches zero while
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6 The choice of business strategy
In the previous section, we derived the owners’ choice of authority structure
for a given business strategy. In this section, I will endogenize the strategy
choice and ask two things: first of all, if there is a change in the equilibrium
business strategy, when will it be accompanied with a change in the allocation
of authority? Secondly, once the owners make their strategy choice, is it an
eﬃcient (i.e., total surplus maximizing) one?
6.1 Business strategy and the allocation of authority
To answer the first question, I will proceed in a step-wise manner and inspect
separately each of the ranges of α-parameter (given in corollary 3) under the
assumption that β does not take on values higher than α. Proceeding in this
way, allows me to cover all the possible cases because the threshold value after
which delegation is chosen for sure under the new strategy (i.e., qpp−s(1−q) ) is
lower than that of the status quo one (i.e., p
2
p−s(1−p)). After going through all
the steps, I summarize the findings in Figure 1.
Step 1. α < p
1−s(1−p) ≡ α (pure centralization under the status quo strat-
egy): centralization is chosen under the new strategy as long as β < q
1−s(1−q) ;
what happens after β reaches this value depends on whether i) qpp−s(1−q) < α
or ii) α < qpp−s(1−q) . Case i): when
q
1−s(1−q) ≤ β <
qp
p−s(1−q) , delegation is cho-
sen under the new strategy if the new manager possesses enough expertise
(i.e., if θ > θnew); for qpp−s(1−q) ≤ β < α, delegation is always chosen. Case
both (p (θ)− q) and (p (θ)− s) remain positive. Hence, there are still incentive advantages
from delegation under both business strategies.
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ii): when q
1−s(1−q) ≤ β < α, delegation is chosen under the new strategy if
θ > θnew.
Step 2. α ≤ α < p2p−s(1−p) ≡ α (conditional delegation under the status
quo strategy): the answer again depends on whether i) qpp−s(1−q) < α or ii) α <
qp
p−s(1−q) . Case i): delegation is chosen for sure under the new strategy for all
α ≤ β < α. Case ii): when α ≤ β < qpp−s(1−q) , (the direction of) the potential
change in the allocation of authority is determined by the core competency
parameter and whether it i) falls below both θold and θnew, ii) falls in between
these two threshold values or iii) exceeds both θjs (interestingly, a switch in
the business strategy may involve a move from delegation to centralization if
θold < θ < θnew; the latter is, however, only possible if β < α since θold > θnew
for all β ≥ α); when qpp−s(1−q) ≤ β < α, delegation is chosen for sure under
the new strategy.
Step 3. α > p2p−s(1−p) (pure delegation under the status quo strategy): there
is no change in the allocation of authority unless β is small enough.
The Figure 1 summarizes these findings (see the next page).15
The following proposition then captures the main result of the preceding
analysis:
Proposition 4 Delegation is more attractive under the new business strat-
egy.
The intuition behind proposition 4 is simple. When the monitoring ability of
the owners is biased in favor of the status quo strategy, the higher opportunity
costs from not delegating direct the owners’ choice towards more delegation
under the new business strategy.
15The dashed lines in the Figure 1 refer to the assumption that α, β ∈ (0, 1).
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Figure 1: Allocation of authority under alternative business strategies
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6.2 Optimal choice of business strategy
Interestingly, when one moves to examine whether the owners actually prefer
to change the business strategy, it turns out that their choice may exhibit
ineﬃcient inertia because of the bias in their monitoring ability. To see
this, note that, as opposed to switching to the new strategy with parallel
allocation of authority, the owners prefer to continue under the status quo
one with delegated versus centralized decision-making when
∆Oold,D ≡
¡
πOD − rOD
¢
= p (θ) [α− p− (β − q)B] + p− qB > 0, (13)
∆Oold,C ≡
¡
πOC − rOC
¢
= s [(1− p)α− (1− q) βB] + p− qB > 0. (14)
To limit the amount of cases to be considered, I concentrate on these two
situations and assume that α > p and β > q (based on (11) and (12), the
latter two are the necessary but not suﬃcient conditions for delegation ever
to be considered).
The equations (13) and (14) are increasing with α and decreasing with
β and q. As is intuitive, continuing under the status quo business strategy
is more likely when the manager of the status quo strategy has well-aligned
interests, when the manager of the new activity has discongruent interests
and when the informational asymmetry caused by strategic changes is large
(i.e., q is low). In addition, ∆Oold,C is increasing with p so that staying in
the status quo business area with centralized decision-making is more likely
when the owners’ own monitoring ability is high.
From the viewpoint of total surplus maximization, the firm should switch
to the new business strategy whenever
∆TSnew,D ≡ TSDnew − TSDold > 0,
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∆TSnew,C ≡ TSCnew − TSCold > 0,
which can be expressed as
∆TSnew,D = (1− p (θ)) [qβ − pα] b−∆Oold,D > 0, (15)
∆TSnew,C = [q (β − s)− p (α− s)] b−∆Oold,C > 0. (16)
By looking at (15) and (16), it is clear that, if ∆Oold,t > 0, t = D,C, the
owners will not change the status quo strategy. However, when ∆TSnew,t > 0,
such a change would be eﬃcient.
Proposition 5 The owners’ lack of knowledge of the new business strategy
may lead to ineﬃcient inertia: a total surplus maximizing restructuring of
the business strategy is not undertaken by the owners.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Based on the equations (15) and (16), it is evident that, in order for the
ineﬃcient inertia ever to emerge when the monitoring ability of the owners
is biased in favor of the status quo strategy (i.e., when p > q), the degree of
managerial congruence has to be higher under the new strategy (i.e., β has to
exceed α). The reasoning for the owners’ unwillingness to switch the strategy,
even though the congruence of interests were higher, is then the following:
when making their choice, the owners consider not only the diﬀerences in
the degree of interest alignment between the two managers but also how
often these conflicts of interest realize (i.e., how often the owners have to
rely on the potentially discongruent project proposal of the manager). From
the viewpoint of the owners, it is possible that the latter eﬀect dominates
the former. As a result, even if the managerial advise were more congruent
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under the new business strategy, this is not necessarily enough to induce
restructuring because, once undertaken, the owners are forced to trust the
managerial advise more often.
7 Concluding remarks
As is shown in the experimental study of Samuelson & Zeckhauser (1988),
individual behavior may exhibit substantial status quo bias originating from
convenience, habit or policy. In this paper, status quo bias is studied in the
context of business strategy choices of firms. It is argued that a potential
source of status quo bias in the business strategy is the reduced ability of
the owners to control the new management. While the existing theoretical
literature on the allocation of authority in organizations has emphasized the
role of the agent with discongruent interests as the source of organizational
frictions and concentrated on finding means to mitigate these frictions, here,
based on the well-established framework by Aghion & Tirole, it is shown that
the resulting ineﬃciencies may well be the outcome of the principal’s own
behavior. In particular, problems may result not just because the manager
chooses a "wrong" project given the business strategy but because the owners
themselves choose the "wrong" business strategy.
Although this paper concentrates on the possibility of ineﬃcient inertia
originating from the owners’ behaviour, not all inertia is necessarily ineﬃ-
cient. In other words, even if the new business strategy were more profitable
(as is assumed in this paper), it is possible that the owners’ choice of not
changing the business strategy is eﬃcient. This happens if the degree of in-
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terest alignment is suﬃciently low under the new strategy or, even though the
degree of interest alignment were the same (or even higher), if the monitoring
ability of the owners is suﬃciently low under the new strategy.
It is, however, worth emphasizing that the ineﬃciency result is robust to
some natural extensions of the model. For example, if the owners could hire a
consultant to raise their monitoring ability under the new strategy, ineﬃcient
status quo bias would still result given that the advice of the consultant is
costly enough. More generally, if and when monitoring is subject to learning-
by-doing (as is suggested in this model), allowing the current owners to sell
out may not be enough to achieve restructuring. Put diﬀerently, under these
circumstances, it is not obvious that there exists alternative owners with
suﬃcient amount of knowledge so that they can compensate the current
owners for their monitoring advantage on the current strategy.
Whether the results of this paper would apply directly, if monetary in-
centives were included, is a more involved question. To shed some light on
this issue, note first that in this model the owners face two incentive prob-
lems: how intensively the manager screens the projects and which project
the manager picks when informed. Without monetary incentives, delegation
can be used to tackle the first problem (i.e., to raise the screening intensity
of the manager). However, when the interests of the parties grow more di-
vergent, delegation makes the second problem (i.e., project selection) more
severe as the owners simultaneously commit to monitor the project choice of
the manager less (in essence, they commit not to interfere in the manager’s
choice).
When monetary incentives are introduced into this framework, it may
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be optimal for the owners to use them to tackle both, only one or none of
these problems.16 The owners’ choice depends on the costs of these options
which, in turn, are essentially determined by the level of the managerial
private benefit, b, and the degree of the agency costs (α, β). Interestingly,
when b is suﬃciently high, it may well be too costly for the owners to align
the project choice using monetary incentives; this then gives rise to two
potential scenarios under which the results of this model could (to somewhat
diﬀerent degrees) still apply. Under the first of these, the owners set a positive
wage (to be paid whenever the owners’ preferred project is chosen) not to
align the project choice but to raise the screening intensity of the manager
under centralized decision-making. In other words, once monetary incentives
are allowed for, it may be optimal for the owners to use them to raise the
screening intensity of the manager while centralized decision-making is used
to monitor more closely the project proposal of the manager. As the interests
of the parties become more aligned, it may even be optimal for the owners
to give up monetary incentives altogether; this then gives rise to a scenario
under which, in accordance with the analysis conducted above, the owners
use delegation to raise the eﬀort level.
Taken together, this paper oﬀers a human capital based explanation on
why privatized firms with old managers and workers as their owners may fail
to restructure their operations. In particular, this paper suggests that special
attention should be paid as to whom firms with evident restructuring needs
16In sketching these ideas, I have in mind incentive schemes that pay a bonus to the
manager whenever he picks the owners’ favorite project and, due to the manager’s limited
liability, a zero wage when he does the opposite.
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are privatized since the initial choices may turn out to be enduring. Simul-
taneously, this paper also suggests that a near-permanent (static) ownership
structure may be a barrier to change for a firm by increasing the risk that
the owners become "too good" at monitoring the management under the
status quo strategy. At the worst, reallocation of capital to new and grow-
ing sectors of economic activity may be threatened if the existing firms are
dominated by owners with vested interests in the current way of doing busi-
ness. Consequently, this paper then implies that, how the ownership of the
firm is structured, is particularly important where new and better strategic
opportunities frequently arise.
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APPENDIX:
Proof of Lemma 1:
To prove lemma 1 note that, by comparing c > 4p (1− p) b in (9) and
c > 4p (1− q) b in (10), it is clear that the latter is the more strict condition
because q < p. Combining this with c < 4p (1− pα) b in (4) and c <
4p (1− qβ) b in (6) gives the following condition:
4p (1− q) b < c < min {4p (1− pα) b,4p (1− qβ) b} . (A.1)
By inspecting (A.1) it is clear that 4p (1− q) b < c < 4p (1− pα) b is the
necessary condition, whenever α ≥ β, because p > q. For this to be a
non-empty region the condition
αp < q < p
then has to hold. When α < β, the necessary condition for c is4p (1− q) b <
c < 4p (1− pα) b, when
αp < q < α
β
p,
and 4p (1− q) b < c < 4p (1− qβ) b, when
α
β
p < q < p.
Proof of Corollary 3:
From the equations (11) and (12) we know that delegation is never chosen
when α ∈ (0, p] and β ∈ (0, q]. It follows that delegation will neither be
chosen when α ∈
³
p, p
1−s(1−p)
´
and β ∈
³
q, q
1−s(1−q)
´
because θj would have
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to exceed one; this contradicts the assumption that θ ∈ [0, 1]. The second
and third part of corollary 3 then result from the facts that θold > 0 if
α < p2p−s(1−p) =
p
1− sp (1−p)
and θnew > 0 if β < qpp−s(1−q) =
q
1− sp (1−q)
(it is
straightforward to show that p
1−s(1−p) <
p
1− sp (1−p)
and q
1−s(1−q) <
q
1− sp (1−q)
).
Proof of Proposition 5:
To facilitate the understanding of the proof, I will first restate the equations
(15) and (16), respectively, and number them anew:
∆TSnew,D = (1− p (θ)) [qβ − pα] b−∆Oold,D, (A.2)
where
∆Oold,D = p (θ) [α− p− (β − q)B] + p− qB,
and
∆TSnew,C = [q (β − s)− p (α− s)] b−∆Oold,C , (A.3)
where
∆Oold,C = s [(1− p)α− (1− q)βB] + p− qB.
Note first that α > p and β > q are the necessary conditions for the owners
ever to consider delegation and they were assumed to hold. Simultaneously,
by assumption, p > q and p > s. By combining these inequalities with q ≶ s,
we get seven possible rankings of the parameters: i) β > α > p > q > s, ii)
β > α > p > s > q, iii) α > β > p > q > s, iv) α > β > p > s > q, v)
α > p > β > q > s, vi) α > p > β > s > q, vii) α > p > s > β > q.
In the cases iii) - vii) it is never possible that the first term on the RHS of
(A.2) or (A.3) is positive. Simultaneously, given the parameter rankings, it
is possible that ∆Oold,t > 0, t = C,D. This requires that B is relatively close
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to 1 and/or i) α is suﬃciently large compared to β, and/or ii) p is suﬃciently
large compared to q. None of these requirements contradicts the ranking of
the parameters in iii) - vii). Hence, given that ∆Oold,t > 0, it follows that
∆TSnew,t < 0 so that one can concentrate on the cases i) and ii).
When β > α > p > q > s or β > α > p > s > q, it is possible that the
first term on the RHS of (A.2) is positive: even though p > q, it is possible
that (qβ − pα) > 0, when β > α. Similarly, the first term on the RHS of
(A.3) is positive, if (p−q) > 0 isn’t too large. Next, by looking at ∆Oold,D and
∆Oold,C , it is clear that the first term on the RHS is negative, because α < β,
q < p and B > 1. For ∆Oold,t > 0 still to hold B then has to be relatively
close to 1 and/or p has to be suﬃciently large compared to q. None of these
requirements contradicts the ranking of the parameters in i) and ii). Hence,
given∆Oold,t > 0, it is possible that∆TSnew,t > 0 if β is relatively large compared
to α and/or b is large (the latter has to hold especially, when (p− q) > 0
increases).
More formally, the parameter values have to fulfil the following six condi-
tions for the ineﬃcient inertia to emerge under both allocations of authority:
1. B > 1 which guarantees that assumption 1 continues to hold;
2. B < min
n
p+p(θ)(α−p)
q+p(θ)(β−q) ≡ BD,
p+sα(1−p)
q+sβ(1−q) ≡ BC
o
which guarantees that
∆Oold,t > 0, t = C,D;
3. either max
©
θold, θnew
ª
< θ < p[1+(α−p)−(β−q)]−q
(1−q)β−(1−p)α ≡ θ or 0 < θ <
min
©
θold, θnew, θ
ª
which guarantee that delegation or centralization,
respectively, is chosen under both business strategies and that BD > 1;
93
4. αβp < q <
p[1−p−(β−α)]
1−p which guarantees that i) action i is only taken
under delegation, ii) (qβ − pα) > 0 in (A.2), and iii) θ > 0;
5. (1− p) > β > α > p where the first inequality guarantees that αβp <
q < p[1−p−(β−α)]
1−p is a non-empty region;
6. max
n
p(β−q)
β(1−q) ,
p(α−p)
α(1−p)
o
< s < min
n
β−q
β(1−q) ,
α−p
α(1−p) ,
p−q
(1−q)β−(1−p)α
o
which
guarantees that θj ∈ (0, 1) and that BC > 1.
Under these conditions, it is then possible to find b > 0 so that ∆TSnew,t >
0 given that ∆Oold,t, t = C,D, are both positive. An example of possible
parameter values is β = 55
100
, α = 50
100
, p = 25
100
, q = 23
100
and s = 19
100
. The
appropriate values of θ and B are then found using conditions 1, 2 and 3
from the list above.
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IV Board structure and CEO succession
Abstract
This paper studies the role and structure of board in context of
succession process by using a framework where the board is responsible
for three tasks: selection, monitoring, and counseling of successor. The
departing CEO has important knowledge that improves the board’s
ability to first find a matching successor and then to provide counseling
to him. However, the departing CEO is simultaneously also eager to
interfere with the successor’s project choice so as to assure access to
private benefits. This paper then argues that, at which point (if at all)
and for how long the predecessor is nominated to the board, can be
used by the shareholders to balance the benefits from the predecessor’s
expertise with the costs that arise from distorted project choice.
JEL Classification: G34; J41; J44.
Keywords: board of directors, composition of board, succession plan-
ning, advisory role of board.
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"The paramount duty of the board of directors of a public corporation is
to select a chief executive oﬃcer [...]" (Business Roundtable Principles of
Corporate Governance 2005)
1 Introduction
Recently, actions to enhance the independency of the board of directors have
been taken both in the USA and in Europe. For instance, New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ both just amended their listing rules to require
the boards of listed firms to have majority of independent directors (see
NYSE Corporate Governance Rules Section 303A (first approved in 2003)
and NASDAQ Listing Qualifications (2003)).1
The preceding eﬀorts reflect the view that the independence of the board
from managerial influence is important for the board’s ability to fulfill its
obligations towards the shareholders. For example, it is commonly feared
that the practice where the incumbent CEO simultaneously also serves as
a member (and, especially, the chairman) of the board compromises the
board’s monitoring role (for discussion of this, see for example Monks and
Minow (1995)). Similarly, it is also feared that the presence of the firm’s
former CEO on the board may threaten the interests of the shareholders by
weakening the successor’s ability to realize reforms. According to Monks and
Minow, one argument against the presence of ex-CEOs on the board is that
they could dominate the board’s agenda and block changes not approved by
them. In the case of Germany, this concern was voiced clearly in a recent
1In France, a new default structure of one-tier board was adopted in 2001 that breaks
the formerly mandatory combination of the roles of the chief executive oﬃcer and the
chairman of the board while in the United Kingdom a recent revision of the corporate
governance standards of listed firms recommends both separating the roles of CEO and
chairman and composing majority of the board of independent directors (see Hopt &
Leyens (2004)).
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article by The Economist (2005); it pointed out that one of the most serious
problems facing German firms is that any new CEO wishing to make radical
changes has to get his plans past his predecessor who typically chairs the
supervisory board and is not keen to see his legacy destroyed.
However, while the board’s ability to act as an eﬀective monitor and
a critical reviewer of corporate strategy is obviously of significance, it is
not the only function of the board. Taking the viewpoint that boards have
other functions besides the task of monitoring the management this paper
builds upon the idea that the ideal structure of the board and the tasks of
the board are interrelated in the sense that, once the role of the board is
widened to also cover other tasks, the shareholders may benefit from having
a less independent board. In this paper, the idea is used to study the role
and structure of board in context of succession process so as to analyze
the potential costs and benefits for shareholders from having the company’s
incumbent or former CEO on the board.
To analyze the implications of succession process for the ideal board struc-
ture, this paper develops a model where the board is responsible for three
tasks. It is first responsible for selecting a successor to the incumbent CEO
who is due to retire at a pre-specified date. Once the successor has taken
oﬃce, the board is in charge of monitoring the successor’s project choice and
providing advice to the successor. There are two key ideas in this paper.
First, the presence of the departing CEO on the board, although facilitating
the ability of the board both to find a matching successor and then to coun-
sel him, simultaneously also weakens the ability of the board to restructure
since the predecessor (either due to legacy concerns or because of empire-
building tendencies) uses the opportunity to distort the successor’s project
choice. Secondly, there are two ways for the predecessor to aﬀect the succes-
sor’s project choice and the access to these depends on the beginning and the
length of the predecessor’s term on the board. In particular, if on the board
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before his retirement, the predecessor is able to select a successor who shares
his biased project preferences while, if on the board after his retirement, the
predecessor is able to use the monitoring role of the board to interfere with
the successor’s project choice.
This then implies that, at which point (if at all) and for how long the
shareholders nominate the predecessor to the board, determines how much
the predecessor is able to distort the project choice and, consequently, to
which extent the shareholders are able to realize restructuring gains. How-
ever, the beginning and the length of the predecessor’s term simultaneously
also aﬀects the predecessor’s opportunity and incentives to raise the match of
and provide counseling to his successor. At each stage, the shareholders then
face a trade-oﬀ. An early (i.e., pre-retirement) nomination, while increasing
the predecessor’s incentives to raise the match of his successor, simultane-
ously also allows the predecessor to choose a successor who shares his biased
project preferences. A late (i.e., post-retirement) or a continued nomination,
although inducing the predecessor to advice his successor, simultaneously
also allows the predecessor to interfere with the successor’s project choice
through the monitoring function of the board.
Taken together, this paper suggests that the extent of restructuring gains,
the firm’s ability to hire good outside directors and the importance of board’s
advisory role aﬀect at which point and for how long the shareholders want
to nominate the predecessor to the board. Low restructuring gains (e.g.,
good firm performance) favor an early and prolonged nomination while high
restructuring gains, the availability of good outside directors and the low im-
portance of mentoring for the successor’s (and the firm’s) performance favor
either an independent board or an early but only a short-term nomination.
This paper also gives rise to two implications of the role of firm and indus-
try characteristics in aﬀecting the ideal board composition. First, this paper
suggests that, for any given firm, diﬀerent board structures can be optimal
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under diﬀerent timepoints of the firm’s life cycle depending on the issues on
the board’s agenda. In accordance with this view, Hermalin and Weisbach
(1988) find that both poor corporate performance and the succession process
aﬀect board composition. In particular, poorly performing firms replace in-
side directors by outsiders which is consistent with the predictions of this
model; in addition, when the CEO nears retirement, insiders are added to
the board which supports the idea that succession process is important for
the ideal board composition.2
Second, this paper suggests that, at any given timepoint, diﬀerent firms
may diﬀer in terms of their ideal board structures because of diﬀerences in
factors such as restructuring needs. This role of firm and industry factors
is reflected, for example, on the recent empirical results of Perry and Shiv-
dasani (2005) who find that poorly performing firms with majority of outside
directors initiate more fundamental restructuring and experience more rapid
recovery, and of Lasfer (2002) and Gillan et al. (2003) who find that high
growth firms have more independent boards. Consequently, as a by-product
of emphasizing how the performance-enhancing eﬀects of increased board in-
dependency are connected to diﬀerences in firm and industry factors, this
paper is able to provide one rationale why much of the empirical research
on board composition has failed to find a clear connection between increased
board independency and improved firm performance.3
On a more general level, one of the main messages of this paper is that
2That ideal board composition is aﬀected by firms’ life cycle is also evident in Boone et
al. (2005) which traces firms for ten years on from their IPOs and finds that firm growth
and diversification tend to increase board size and independence.
3For a general discussion on the mixed empirical results of board composition and firm
performance, see the survey by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); for papers indicating a
negative, a non-existent and a positive connection between the split of CEO and chairman
titles and firm performance, see, respectively, Brickley et al. (1997), Baliga et al. (1996)
and Rechner and Dalton (1991).
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the shareholders may benefit from management-controlled boards. In this
respect, this paper is connected to a growing strand of theoretical literature
which examines the benefits of weak boards. Before discussing this literature
in detail in the next section, I first briefly comment why the focus of this
paper is on the board’s role in succession planning and in provision of advice
to the management and why the circumstances surrounding the incumbent’s
exit are relevant.
According to the American Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate
Governance (2005), the single most important duty of the board of directors
of a public corporation is to select a well-qualified CEO. However, CEO selec-
tion is a demanding task to accomplish successfully as the characteristics of
the successor should fit to the organizational structures and business condi-
tions (see, e.g., Gerstein and Reisman (1983)).4 The importance, complexity
and sensitivity of the task together with the intimate knowledge required then
suggests that not only is the adequacy of the outside directors extremely im-
portant for successful succession but also that, as a previous title holder,
the predecessor may possess an advantage in finding a matching successor.5
Similarly, based on his experience and knowledge, the predecessor may also
have a corresponding advantage in counseling his successor. This idea of the
relevance of the insider’s knowledge is also reflected in the argument of Tirole
(2006) who, in context of considering the ways to reform the functioning of
board, notes that it is not a trivial task since parties close to the firm (and
therefore susceptible to conflict of interest) are also likely to be best informed
about the firm and its environment.
4Simultaneously, organizational studies also show that a change of CEO is a disruptive
event for whole organization (see Kesner and Sebora (1994)).
5That the quality of outside board members is critical for finding a fitting successor
is evident in the examples provided by Khurana (2001) where, for instance, the lack
of functional diversity in director backgrounds led a technology company to choose an
unsuitable successor.
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However, the predecessor’s knowledge is likely to be of value only when
the predecessor’s tenure as CEO has been suﬃciently long and the departure
is voluntary since both of these factors suggest that the incumbent has done
reasonably good job and that he has had the opportunity to accumulate
enough knowledge to make his skills of value. Taken together, the preceding
factors then imply that, although this model could equally well apply to
departures due to alternative employment, this framework is particularly
applicable to situations where the incumbent CEO is leaving due to normal
retirement. This view is further supported by the findings of Brickley et
al. (1999) according to which normal retirement is the dominant reason
for CEO departures and that nearly 60 to 70 percent of outgoing CEOs in
retirement age (i.e., aged 60 or older) continue to serve on their own board.
Furthermore, Brickley et al. find the likelihood of service on own board to be
positively linked to firm’s good pre-retirement performance and, especially,
to the length of CEO’s tenure.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related
theoretical literature. In Section 3, I set up the model. In Section 4, I
analyze the model so as to derive comparative static results. Finally, Section
5 concludes. All proofs are in Appendix.
2 Related theoretical literature
One of the general messages of this paper is that governance reforms regard-
ing board structure should leave room for individual choice since practices
(like managerial dominance of the board) typically seen as detrimental can ac-
tually sometimes be desirable for the shareholders. Consequently, this paper
is related to a growing strand of theoretical literature examining the poten-
tial benefits of weak (i.e., management-friendly or management-controlled)
boards.
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For instance, Almazan and Suarez (2003) show that yielding the CEO
control over the board in replacement decisions can be in the interest of the
shareholders when firm performance is a noisy signal of managerial eﬀort.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), in turn, show that good prior performance
may enable the CEO to exercise greater control over director selection and,
consequently, may allow the CEO to control board’s replacement decisions.
These papers, however, deal with direct managerial entrenchment (i.e., look
at situations where the incumbent CEO wants to stay on) while this paper
is concerned with another source of entrenchment; namely, a retiring CEO’s
ability to entrench his strategic visions through the selection process of his
successor. In a sense, good past performance leads also here to greater CEO
control through the increased likelihood that the predecessor will be involved
in selecting and advising his successor.6
The papers of Almazan and Suarez, and Hermalin and Weisbach also
diﬀer from this one by concentrating on boards as the monitors of man-
agement and by defining monitoring as a mechanism to learn managerial
ability so that eﬀective replacement decisions can be made by the board.
Consequently, this paper is more closely related to those by Adams and Fer-
reira (2005), Gutiérrez-Urtiaga (2000), Harris and Raviv (2005), and Raheja
(2005) which, as this paper, define the board’s monitoring role as the power
to approve management’s project proposals as well as specify the board’s role
more broadly (so that the board may also have other roles besides monitor-
ing).7
6Reluctance to initiate managerial replacement may also result from the fear that it
reveals unfavorable information about board members and leads to losing of board seat. In
Graziano and Luporini (2003), the board is unwilling to replace CEO because it reveals the
board’s incompetency to select an able CEO in the first place and, consequently, exposes
the firm to takeovers; in Warther (1998), reluctance arises as a failed replacement attempt
by a board member leads to his own dismissal.
7For a paper that treats monitoring as a process to unveil managerial ability but con-
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In Adams and Ferreira, the board has a dual role as an advisor and moni-
tor of management. The quality of board’s advice is improved if the manager
shares his private information with the board. However, information shar-
ing also enables the board to interfere more eﬀectively with the manager’s
project choice. Since independent boards are assumed to be more intensive
monitors to start with, the shareholders may benefit from selecting a less
independent board so as to induce the manager to reveal his information to
the board. In a framework where the board has similar role as a monitor and
a provider of expertise or advice, Gutiérrez-Urtiaga and Harris and Raviv
reach the same conclusion. Raheja, in turn, uses somewhat diﬀerent frame-
work where the board is responsible for approving the project choice but may
use CEO succession decision as a reward to induce corporate insiders (i.e.,
members of top management team) to reveal their private information con-
cerning the projects. Once again, the shareholders may benefit from a less
independent board since, as Raheja argues, a lower number of outside direc-
tors on the board may intensify the competition among insiders to become
the next CEO and, consequently, may increase the incentives of insiders to
reveal their information to the board.
The authors then draw varying implications. Adams and Ferreira ar-
gue that, by allowing the separation of advisory and monitoring roles of the
board, a two-tier board can be a possible vehicle to induce more information
sharing. Gutiérrez-Urtiaga and Raheja, in turn, argue that industry diﬀer-
ences may arise in the degree of desired board independence and, in the case
siders the board to have multiple roles, see Graziano and Luporini (2005). In their paper,
board structure (in particular, two-tier board) serves as a mechanism to restore manage-
rial initiative without reducing the ability of the board to make replacement decisions. In
analyzing the succession process and a trade-oﬀ between managerial skills and potential
for expropriation of private benefits, this paper is also connected to that of Burkart et al.
(2003) who study the decision of a firm’s founder to pass the management of the company
either over to an heir or a professional manager.
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of Raheja, also in the size of the ideal board. Harris and Raviv, in addition
to addressing the questions of board size and number of outside directors,
argue that the importance of the insiders knowledge may lead a formally
outsider-controlled board to delegate project selection to the insiders.
Although this paper is related to those of Adams and Ferreira, Gutiérrez-
Urtiaga, Harris and Raviv, and Raheja, there is, however, one important
diﬀerence. In the preceding papers, the shareholders are essentially concerned
how to make good project selection decisions, and the corporate insiders
have private information from the viewpoint of this decision. In this paper,
the shareholders are concerned how to make two interrelated but sequential
decisions (namely, successor and project selection), and the insiders have
relevant knowledge from viewpoint of both of these decisions. As a result, in
contrast to just asking whether the shareholders could benefit from having
inside directors on the board, this paper is then able to address the issue
whether it makes any diﬀerence for the shareholders at which point an insider
(with relevant knowledge from the viewpoint of board’s functions) enters and
exits the board. In particular, since selecting the successor comes up on the
board’s agenda at an earlier timepoint than monitoring and counseling the
successor, this paper suggests that the shareholders can use the beginning
and the length of the CEO’s term on the board as a mechanism to determine
which of its functions are under the control of the CEO and, consequently,
to which extent the CEO is able to distort the project selection.
3 The model
Consider a firm with shareholders, a board of directors and a CEO. Initially,
the firm is run by an incumbent CEO who holds an equity stake α in the
company; the rest of the shares are held by the shareholders. The incumbent
CEO is due to retire at a pre-specified date. Before the incumbent retires,
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it is the responsibility of the board of directors to choose a successor to the
incumbent CEO. Once the incumbent has retired, the board is in charge of
monitoring the successor’s project choice and counseling the successor on
the project’s implementation. Given the tasks of the board, the shareholders
have to choose the structure of the board by taking into account how it aﬀects
the ability of the board to fulfill its functions. In particular, the shareholders
need to decide to which extent (if any) they want to utilize the expertise of
the incumbent CEO in facilitating the board’s ability to execute some of its
tasks.
There are two time periods indexed as t = 1, 2 in the model. The incum-
bent CEO is due to retire at the end of t = 1. I will next go through in detail
the decisions the parties face at the pre-retirement stage t = 1 and at the
post-retirement stage t = 2. After that I summarize the timing of events.
All the parties in the model are assumed to be risk-neutral. In addition, the
managers are assumed to be protected by limited liability.
Time period t = 1: The pre-retirement stage.
The choice of board structure. In the beginning of the first period, the share-
holders face a decision concerning the structure of the board. By assumption,
the board of directors can be of two polar types: independent or management-
controlled. Under the first alternative, the board is composed of independent
(i.e., non-aﬃliated) directors. To abstract from any moral hazard concerns,
the interests of independent directors are assumed to be perfectly aligned
with those of the shareholders; this ensures that any decision taken by an
independent board is in the interest of the shareholders. Under the second
alternative, the incumbent CEO sits on the board and is able to control the
issues that come up on its agenda; consequently, the board’s decisions will
reflect the interests of the incumbent CEO and may conflict those of the
shareholders.
In the beginning of t = 1, the shareholders choose whether to nominate
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the incumbent CEO to the board or not. The selected board will then be in
charge of choosing the successor to the incumbent CEO. In the beginning of
t = 2, the shareholders again choose whether to nominate the predecessor to
the board or not. Consequently, since the choice of the shareholders at t = 2
may diﬀer from that at t = 1, the type of board in charge of monitoring and
counseling the successor after the incumbent’s retirement is not necessarily
the same that is responsible for selecting the successor at the pre-retirement
stage.
This then implies that, depending on the beginning and the length of
the incumbent CEO’s term on the board, the incumbent is able to control a
diﬀerent array of the board’s functions. The shareholders can then use the
beginning and the length of the incumbent’s term to aﬀect the magnitude
of board’s decisions under the incumbent’s control. Taken together, the
following four possibilities arise for the shareholders: i) the incumbent never
sits on the board and, consequently, controls none of its functions, ii) the
incumbent sits on the board until his retirement and is able to control the
selection of his successor, iii) the incumbent sits on the board only after
his retirement and is able to control the monitoring and counseling of his
successor or iv) the incumbent sits on the board both before and after his
retirement and controls all the board’s functions. Which of these alternatives
is ideal from the viewpoint of the shareholders will depend not only on the
skills of the incumbent CEO in screening and advising the successor but also
on the incentives and the opportunity of the incumbent to interfere with the
successor’s project choice.
The selection of successor. Before the incumbent retires, it is the respon-
sibility of the board to find a successor to the incumbent CEO. There are
two "quality" levels of successors, high or low. The quality of the successor
refers here to the successor’s match (fit) to this particular organization and
job. The match of the successor aﬀects the cash flow that is generated by a
109
project. If the successor is a good match, the profits are X = Π > 0 while,
if the successor is a poor match, the profits are X = 0. In what follows, it
will use the terms quality, match and fit interchangeably so as to refer to the
compatibility of the successor with the job.
The composition of the board determines the board’s ability to choose a
successor who is a good match. An independent board is able to choose
a good match with an exogenously given probability θL. The ability of
management-controlled board to select a successor who is a good match de-
pends on whether the incumbent CEO takes a non-contractible eﬀort choice
e ∈ {0, 1} with a cost ce. By choosing e = 1, the incumbent CEO can raise
θL to θH , ∆θ =
¡
θH − θL
¢
> 0.
There are at least two possible interpretations for∆θ. First, the diﬀerence
could capture the role of the incumbent CEO’s knowledge (as the previous
title holder) about the required qualifications for the job of CEO in increas-
ing the match between the successor and the job. This interpretation of ∆θ
emphasizes the fact that, although the firm could attract and hire good out-
side directors, the firm and industry characteristics are such (the role of firm-
and industry-specific knowledge is important, the industry is complex etc.)
that the incumbent CEO has an experience-based advantage in the screening
of successor. Alternatively, the diﬀerence ∆θ could capture the role of some
firm or industry characteristics (e.g., relatively low visibility) which weakens
the ability of the firm to attract and hire good outside directors. Such an
eﬀect could also be caused by legislative action. For instance, Holmström
and Kaplan (2003) note that some provisions of the recent Sarbanes-Oxley
Act may invite aggressive litigation; the fear of litigation, in turn, makes it
harder for companies to attract qualified board members.
After the successor has been chosen, the incumbent CEO retires and
leaves the post of CEO.
Time period t = 2: The post-retirement stage.
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The selection of project. Under the successor’s term, the firm can implement
one project. The successor is in charge of looking for and implementing
the project while the board is responsible for monitoring and counseling
the successor. As in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Burkart et al. (1997),
the process of looking for a project is modelled here as an attempt by the
successor to distinguish a priori identical projects; similarly, monitoring is
modelled as the attempt by the board to interfere with the successor’s project
choice.
The firm faces all together N ≥ 4 potential projects which generate a
verifiable cash flow and, potentially, a non-verifiable private benefit. One of
the projects (indexed as project 0) is so called safe project which generates
a known cash flow of zero as well as zero private benefits. Of the remaining
(N − 1) projects only two (indexed as projects 1 and 2) are relevant; all the
other (N − 3) projects involve large negative payoﬀs and no one wants to
undertake them. However, all the (N − 1) projects look a priori identical.
To distinguish the projects 1 and 2 the successor then needs to undertake
further investigation. For simplicity, the successor’s screening technology is
assumed to take the following form: with no cost, the successor is able to
distinguish the projects 1 and 2 with probability one.8
The projects 1 and 2 are similar in the sense that, if the successor is of
low quality, both projects generate a zero cash flow and no private benefits.
However, if the successor is of high quality, the two projects diﬀer in terms of
8That the successor is perfectly informed about the projects is not crucial here; nor
is it crucial that becoming informed is independent of match quality. However, what is
important, as will become more clear in below, is the possibility that the successor is the
only one informed. The successor’s cost of acquiring information, in turn, is set to zero
so as to abstract from the problem (emphasized in Aghion and Tirole and Burkart et
al.) that monitoring could reduce the incentives of the successor to acquire information.
However, despite this simplification, monitoring is costly in this model because it allows
the distortion of project choice.
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the level of the cash flow as well as in terms of the private benefits they gen-
erate; the project 1 generates a private benefit b > 0 to the predecessor (i.e.,
the former CEO) and a cash flow of R > 0 while the project 2 yields a higher
cash flow of (R+ τ) , τ > 0, but zero private benefits to the predecessor.
In this model, the private benefit b has two alternative interpretations.
First of all, it could stand for the extent of the predecessor’s legacy concerns
capturing the benefit for the predecessor of successfully preserving his legacy
in the firm. Alternatively, b could capture the benefit for the predecessor,
who is an empire-builder, of sitting on the board of a successfully expanded
firm. In both cases, τ could capture the restructuring gains from successfully
streamlining the corporate structure.
While the interpretation of τ is invariant to the choice between legacy
concerns and empire-building, the interpretation of b has implications for the
value that the predecessor places on having a post-retirement board seat. In
particular, if interpreted as a legacy benefit, the consumption of b, although
conditional on the post-retirement project choice, does not necessarily require
that the predecessor sits on the board under his successor’s term; it merely
necessitates a successor sympathetic to these concerns. Under the alternative
interpretation, the access to b, however, requires a post-retirement board seat.
Since the interpretation of b will have some bearing on the incentives of the
predecessor, I do not at this point exclude either of these interpretations.
The existence of the private benefits imply that, despite the predecessor’s
equity stake α, the private benefits (if high enough) can create a conflict of
interest between the shareholders and the predecessor over the choice of post-
retirement project. To concentrate on situations where a conflict of interest
arises, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 : b > ατ .
Assumption 1 ensures that the private benefits associated with the project 1
exceed the predecessor’s share of the additional cash flow generated by the
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project 2. Consequently, assumption 1 implies that, if given the opportunity,
the predecessor will try to make sure that the project 1 is chosen.
There are two avenues for the predecessor to aﬀect the post-retirement
project choice. The first of these arises in the selection phase of the succes-
sor. In particular, as opposed to an independent board which is assumed to
be able to choose for sure a successor who shares the shareholders’ project
preferences, the predecessor, if on the board before his retirement, is assumed
to be able to choose with a probability λ ∈ [0, 1] a successor who shares the
predecessor’s project preferences. In this case, the private benefits b are as-
sumed to have a public good nature; in particular, the successor is assumed
to be able to share the private benefits with the predecessor without the
successor’s consumption decreasing the amount available to the predecessor.
Consider, for example, the possibility of a predecessor with empire-building
tendencies to select a successor with similar attributes.9
Interestingly, there is also a potential alternative justification for a posi-
tive λ. Cornell and Welch (1996) argue that people can distinguish between
high- and low-character individuals more accurately when the people being
sorted are of similar cultural type (cultural type refers to factors like race,
sex, schooling and professional background). Consequently, in this setting,
the ability of the predecessor to raise the quality of his successor (i.e., to raise
θ) could be tied to the similarity of the successor with his predecessor (i.e., to
a positive λ). This could then explain the entrenchment of the predecessor’s
visions even without preference for similarity.
9Note that, although information acquisition is costless so that the successor does not
have to be oﬀered an equity stake so as to induce him to acquire information, an equity
stake might be oﬀered so as to align interests over the project choice. However, as long
as the size of possible equity stake is restricted to α, assumption 1 ensures that oﬀering
a stake to the successor does not solve the project selection problem. In what follows, I
concentrate on this situation and assume, for simplicity, that the successor is oﬀered no
stake.
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The second opportunity for the predecessor to aﬀect the post-retirement
project choice arises in the project selection phase since the implementation
of a project is conditional on the board’s approval. In particular, to monitor
and potentially interfere with the successor’s project choice, the board also
gathers information about the projects so as to distinguish them. For simplic-
ity, the board’s monitoring technology takes the following form: with no cost,
the board is able distinguish the projects with probability p.10 Whenever the
board is able to distinguish the projects, it will choose its preferred project
which, depending on the composition of the board, is either the project 1 or
the project 2. When the board is unable to distinguish the projects, the suc-
cessor will choose his preferred project which, once again, is either the project
1 or the project 2. In this model, the project selection then boils down to
a choice between the projects 1 and 2. In particular, because the successor
is always fully informed about the projects and because the projects 1 and
2 are (from the viewpoint of all parties) at least as good as the safe project,
the project 0 is never actually undertaken in this model.
A natural follow-up question arises. What motivates the shareholders to
nominate the predecessor to the board given that the private benefits drive
the predecessor to distort the post-retirement project choice at the expense
of the cash flow? At the pre-retirement stage such a motive arises if the
prospect of private benefits induces the predecessor to take action (i.e., to
raise the successor’s fit) that the equity stake α alone is insuﬃcient to induce.
To concentrate on this situation, I make the following assumption:
10Consequently, both types of board are assumed to have access to the same monitoring
technology. However, if (as is typically thought) an independent board were assumed to
be more eﬀective monitor than a management-controlled board, it should not undermine
the result of this paper that the shareholders could benefit from a weak board; in fact, (if
anything) it should strengthen the willingness of the shareholders to involve the predecessor
in the functioning of the board because it reduces the costs from doing so.
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Assumption 2 : the equity stake α alone is insuﬃcient to induce the prede-
cessor to raise the fit of the successor.
Taken together, assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that, to improve the succes-
sor’s match, the predecessor has to have an opportunity to aﬀect the post-
retirement project choice and, once in the possession of such opportunity, he
will use it to distort the project choice.
In what follows, I concentrate on a situation where the possibility to aﬀect
the project choice through monitoring is not enough for the predecessor to
raise θ but he has to be given control over the choice of his successor. This
then immediately raises another question. What motivates the shareholders
either to keep or nominate the predecessor to the board at the post-retirement
stage given that the possibility to monitor the successor’s project choice has
no positive eﬀect on the willingness of the predecessor to raise the match
quality? I argue that such a motive may arise from the advisory role of the
board. I will next turn to this issue.
The counseling by the board. After the choice of the project but before its
implementation, the board can provide advice to a low quality successor so
as to increase the probability of realizing the cash flow X = Π > 0; after
counseling, the successor will implement the project and the payoﬀs realize.
The board’s ability to provide counseling depends here on two factors: the
access to information about the projects and the composition of the board.
First, for the board to be able to advise the successor it has to have informa-
tion about the projects. In this model, the role of information in the advisory
process is captured in the following simple way: only if informed about the
projects (i.e., only if capable to distinguish the projects), the board is able to
counsel the successor. This is a rather natural assumption. For instance, in
the case of independent board it means that only if able to determine which
strategy allows the successful streamlining of the corporate structure, the in-
dependent directors are able to assist the successor on implementing such a
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strategy. Secondly, when informed, the management-controlled board has an
advantage in the counseling of the successor. That is, while the independent
board is able to raise the probability that a successor of poor match generates
the cash flow X = Π > 0 from zero to aL, the management-controlled board
is able to raise that probability from zero to aH , ∆a =
¡
aH − aL
¢
> 0.
Two conclusions immediately follow. First, to which degree counseling
actually is needed depends on how good match the successor initially is.
This, in turn, may depend not only on the ability of the board to find a
fitting candidate but also on the job characteristics such as the importance of
mentoring and on-the-job training for performance. Secondly, although there
are no direct eﬀort costs from counseling so that advice will automatically
be provided, the gathering of information by the board that is necessary
for the counseling also forms the basis for the monitoring of projects. This
then means that the same information that allows the management-controlled
board to interfere with the successor’s project choice is also essential to realize
the management-controlled board’s higher advisory potential.11
As a result, when deciding on the beginning and the length of the prede-
cessor’s term on the board, the shareholders face a twofold trade-oﬀ. At
the pre-retirement stage, the trade-oﬀ is between the likelihood of find-
ing an unbiased versus a highly matching successor. More specifically, the
management-controlled board, although having a higher chance of selecting a
high-quality successor, simultaneously will choose a successor whose project
preferences contradict (with a positive probability) those of the shareholders;
the independent board, at the expense of having a lower chance of finding a
successor of good match, will in turn choose a successor with aligned pref-
11In essence, monitoring and counseling cannot be separated here; in particular, to make
the provision of advice a non-trivial matter, an independent board cannot communicate its
information to the predecessor (either due to too large time delay or loss of information)
so as to extract advice from him.
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erences. At the post-retirement stage, the trade-oﬀ is between the advisory
potential versus the opportunity to interfere with the project choice. In par-
ticular, although the advisory potential of the management-controlled board
is higher, the information that the board needs so as to counsel the succes-
sor simultaneously enables it to distort the project choice; the independent
board, in turn, has a lower advisory potential but any interference with the
successor’s project choice is in the interest of the shareholders.
The timing of events. Taken together, the events of the model proceed in
the following way:
Time period t = 1 (the pre-retirement stage):
• the shareholders choose whether to nominate the departing CEO to the
board or not;
• the board selects a successor to the incumbent after which the incum-
bent retires and steps down as CEO;
Time period t = 2 (the post-retirement stage):
• the shareholders choose whether to have the predecessor on the board
or not;
• the board monitors the project choice of the successor; after the choice
of project, the board provides counseling to the successor; after this,
the successor implements the project and the payoﬀs realize.
4 The analysis
In this section, I first derive the payoﬀs of the shareholders and the prede-
cessor under the alternative board structures; after that, I turn to analyze
the comparative statics.
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The model is solved by using backwards induction. To separate the alter-
native board structures, I refer to the case where the incumbent never sits on
the board as the fully independent board, to the case where the incumbent
sits on the board only after his retirement as the ex—CEO-controlled board,
to the case where the incumbent sits on the board only until his retirement
as the incumbent-controlled board and to the case where the incumbent sits
on the board both before and after his retirement as the fully management-
controlled board.
4.1 The fully independent board
In the case of fully independent board, the predecessor never sits on the
board. Consequently, the successor is selected and then monitored and ad-
vised by a board consisting of independent directors. In this case, the succes-
sor is a of high quality with probability θL and of low quality with probability¡
1− θL
¢
. When the successor is of low quality, the board provides counseling
to him which raises the probability of realizing X = Π > 0 from zero to aL.
Counseling, however, requires that the board is informed about the projects;
this happens with probability p. As a consequence, the overall advisory po-
tential of the independent board is
¡
1− θL
¢
paL. When informed about the
projects, the board can also use its information to interfere with the succes-
sor’s project choice. However, in the case of fully independent board, there
is no need for such intervention since the board is able to choose for sure a
successor with aligned preferences. As a result, whenever the successor is in-
formed about the projects (which happens with probability one) the project
2 with the cash flow of (R+ τ) and zero private benefits is chosen.
The payoﬀs to the shareholders and the predecessor, respectively, are
πSHI =
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
paL
¤
(1− α) [R+ τ ] , (1)
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and
πPRI =
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
paL
¤
α [R+ τ ] .
These payoﬀs require that the equity stake α alone is insuﬃcient to induce the
predecessor to raise θ at the pre-retirement stage. Formally, this necessitates
that the following condition holds:
πPRI
¡
θ = θL
¢
> πPRI (θ = θ
H),
c > ∆θ
¡
1− paL
¢
α [R+ τ ] ≡ c0. (C1)
In essence, condition (C1) rules out the possibility that the predecessor would
help the independent directors in finding a fitting and unbiased successor.
4.2 The ex-CEO-controlled board
In the case of ex-CEO-controlled board, the predecessor sits on the board
after his retirement. As a result, the successor is selected by an independent
board while monitoring and counseling are conducted by a board controlled
by the predecessor. In this case, the successor is of high quality with prob-
ability θL and of low quality with probability
¡
1− θL
¢
. When the successor
is of low quality, the predecessor (whenever informed about the projects)
provides counseling to the successor; this raises the probability of realizing
X = Π > 0 from zero to aH . The overall advisory potential of the ex-
CEO-controlled board is then
¡
1− θL
¢
paH which is higher than that of the
independent board.
However, when informed about the projects, the predecessor also uses
his information to interfere with the successor’s project choice. As a result,
whenever the predecessor is informed about the projects, the project 1 with
the cash flow of R and private benefit b is chosen. Only when the predecessor
is uninformed, which happens with probability (1− p), the successor is able
to choose the project 2 with the cash flow of (R+ τ) and zero private benefits.
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In comparison with the fully independent board, the project 2 is then chosen
with a lower probability.
The payoﬀs to the shareholders and the predecessor, respectively, are now
given by
πSHE =
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
paH
¤
(1− α)R+ (1− p) θL (1− α) τ , (2)
πPRE =
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
paH
¤
αR+ (1− p) θLατ + p
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
aH
¤
b.
For these payoﬀs to realize the predecessor still has to be unwilling to help the
independent directors in finding a fitting but unbiased successor.12 Formally,
this requires that
πPRE
¡
θ = θL
¢
> πPRE
¡
θ = θH
¢
,
c > ∆θ
¡
1− paH
¢
αR+∆θ (1− p)ατ +∆θp
¡
1− aH
¢
b ≡ c1. (C2)
From now on, I will concentrate on situations where the conditions (C1)
and (C2) simultaneously hold. This then requires that c > max {c0, c1}
is satisfied. Under these circumstances, nominating the predecessor to the
board before his retirement may be valuable for the shareholders if it induces
the predecessor to raise θ.
4.3 The incumbent-controlled board
In the case of incumbent-controlled board, the predecessor sits on the board
until his retirement. As a result, the successor is selected by a board con-
trolled by the predecessor and monitored and advised by a board controlled
by independent directors. Given that the predecessor exerts eﬀort in the
12These payoﬀs also necessitate that the firing costs are suﬃciently high so that the
predecessor doesn’t fire the unbiased successor chosen by the independent board and hire a
replacement who (with a positive probability) shares the predecessor’s project preferences.
For the derivation of the suﬃcient firing costs, see the Appendix.
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selection phase of the successor so as to raise θ, the successor is of high qual-
ity with probability θH and of low quality with probability
¡
1− θH
¢
. When
the successor is of low quality, the independent directors (whenever informed
about the projects) provide counseling to him. The overall advisory poten-
tial of the board will then be
¡
1− θH
¢
paL. Notice that, since θH > θL, the
advisory role of the board is reduced in comparison to the preceding two
cases.
However, since in control of the board before his retirement, the predeces-
sor uses the opportunity to select a successor who (with probability λ) shares
his project preferences. Consequently, when informed about the projects,
the independent directors now also use their information to interfere with
the project choice of the successor. As a result, whenever the independent
directors are informed about the projects, the project 2 with the cash flow of
(R+ τ) and zero private benefits is chosen. When the independent directors
are uninformed, which happens with probability (1− p), the project 1 with
the cash flow of R and private benefit b is chosen with probability λ.
The payoﬀs to the shareholders and the predecessor, respectively, are
πSHC =
£
θH +
¡
1− θH
¢
paL
¤
(1− α)R (3)
+
£
θH (1− λ (1− p)) +
¡
1− θH
¢
paL
¤
(1− α) τ ,
πPRC =
£
θH + p
¡
1− θH
¢
aL
¤
αR
+
£
θH (1− λ (1− p)) +
¡
1− θH
¢
paL
¤
ατ + θH (1− p)λb− c.
Naturally, for the predecessor to be willing to raise the successor’s fit, it must
be true that
πPRC
¡
θ = θH
¢
> πPRC
¡
θ = θL
¢
,
c < ∆θ
¡
1− paL
¢
α (R+ τ) +∆θ (1− p)λ (b− ατ) ≡ c0. (D1)
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Interestingly, a comparison between the conditions (C1) and (D1) reveals
that the nature of the predecessor’s private benefit has an important impact
on his incentives.
Lemma 1 When the predecessor is an empire-builder who derives a positive
private benefit from sitting on the board of a successfully enlarged company,
restricting the predecessor’s term on the board to cover only the pre-retirement
period will not motivate the predecessor to improve the quality of his succes-
sor.
Lemma 1 follows immediately when one sets b equal to zero in (D1); i.e.,
assumes that the access to empire benefits is conditional on a post-retirement
board seat. This then leaves the equity stake α as the sole source of incentives.
However, the equity stake has already been ruled out as a suﬃcient motive by
the condition in (C1). Consequently, the condition in (D1) cannot be satisfied
without simultaneously violating the condition that c > max {c0, c1}.
Lemma 2 When the predecessor derives a private benefit from successfully
preserving his legacy in the firm, a term on the board restricted to cover only
the pre-retirement period may induce the predecessor to improve the quality
of his successor.
To understand lemma 2, note first that, when b is positive in (D1), the
condition in (D1) is always greater than that in (C1). This then implies
that, if (D1) also exceeds (C2), a pre-retirement nomination may be valuable
for the shareholders since, in contrast to the cases of delayed nomination or
no nomination at all, it may induce the predecessor to raise θ.13
13Remark : this paper concentrates on board membership as a means to induce the
predecessor to raise θ. However, such a motivation could also possibly arise from the
fact that a formally outsider-controlled board delegates the selection of successor to the
predecessor. Fortunately, this possibility does not invalidate the result that a weak board
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4.4 The fully management-controlled board
In the case of fully management-controlled board, the predecessor sits on the
board both before and after his retirement. Consequently, the predecessor
controls the selection, monitoring and counseling of the successor. Given
that the predecessor exerts eﬀort to raise θ, the successor is of high quality
with probability θH and of low quality with probability
¡
1− θH
¢
. When
the successor is of low quality, the predecessor (whenever informed about
the projects) provides counseling to him. The overall advisory potential of
the fully management-controlled board is then
¡
1− θH
¢
paH . Consequently,
as compared to the case where the predecessor’s term on the board ends
with his retirement, one advantage of extending the predecessor’s term to
the post-retirement period is the improved advisory potential of board.
However, when in control of the board both before and after his retire-
ment, the predecessor uses the opportunity not only to select a successor who
(with probability λ) shares his project preferences but also, when informed
about the projects, to interfere with the successor’s project choice. As a re-
sult, whenever the predecessor is informed about the projects, the project 1
with the cash flow of R and private benefit b is chosen. When the predeces-
sor is uninformed, which happens with probability (1− p), the successor still
chooses the project 1 with probability λ and the project 2 with the cash flow
of (R+ τ) and zero private benefits only with probability (1− λ). It is then
evident that, from the viewpoint of the shareholders, this board structure
leads to the lowest chance of their preferred project being implemented.
may be optimal; nor does it invalidate the diﬀerences between this paper and that of
Harris and Raviv which considers a situation where the insiders have relevant knowledge
only with respect of one decision (i.e., project selection). Consequently, in contrast to
Harris and Raviv, the issue of which decisions (successor and/or project selection) the
insiders are allocated control over still arises.
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The payoﬀs to the shareholders and the predecessor, respectively, are
πSHM =
£
θH +
¡
1− θH
¢
paH
¤
(1− α)R+ θH (1− p) (1− λ) (1− α) τ , (4)
πPRM =
£
θH +
¡
1− θH
¢
paH
¤
αR+ θH (1− p) (1− λ)ατ
+
£
θH (p+ λ (1− p)) +
¡
1− θH
¢
paH
¤
b− c.
Of course, these payoﬀs require that the predecessor is willing to raise the
successor’s fit. Formally, this necessitates that
πPRM
¡
θ = θH
¢
> πPRM
¡
θ = θL
¢
,
c < ∆θ
¡
1− paH
¢
αR+∆θ (1− p)ατ+∆θp
¡
1− aH
¢
b+∆θλ (1− p) (b− ατ) ≡ c1.
(D2)
In contrast to the case where the predecessor’s term on the board ends with
his retirement (and, consequently, the predecessor’s access to private benefits
may not be guaranteed), extending the predecessor’s term to cover the post-
retirement period allows the predecessor to consume b independently of its
type. As a result, in contrast to the shorter term, an extended term of the
predecessor on the board may have another advantage besides the board’s
improved advisory potential:
Lemma 3 Extending the predecessor’s term on the board to cover both the
pre-retirement and the post-retirement periods may motivate the predecessor
to improve the quality of his successor independently of the type of predeces-
sor’s private benefits.
To understand lemma 3, note first that, in contrast to the case where the
predecessor’s term on the board ends with his retirement, b is now positive in
(D2) under both interpretations of private benefits; as a result, the condition
in (D2) always exceeds that in (C2). This then implies that, if the condition
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in (D2) also exceeds that in (C1), an extended term on the board may induce
the predecessor to raise θ independently of the type of predecessor’s private
benefits.
Taken together, the analysis of the alternative board structures suggests
that, for the pre-retirement nomination to have a diﬀering impact on the
incentives of the predecessor than a post-retirement nomination or no nom-
ination at all, the conditions (C1) and (C2) as well as the conditions (D1)
and (D2) have to simultaneously hold. This then requires that not only the
condition c > max {c0, c1} but also the condition c < min {c0, c1} is satisfied.
A comparison of these conditions reveals that:
Proposition 4 When ατ < b < b, the level of private benefits is so low that
even an early nomination to the board is insuﬃcient to induce the predecessor
to raise the quality of his successor. When b < b < b, an early nomination,
in contrast to a delayed nomination or no nomination at all, can induce
the predecessor to raise the quality of his successor. When b > b, the level of
private benefits is so high that even an anticipated post-retirement nomination
would induce the predecessor to raise the quality of his successor.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 4 captures the idea that, for a pre-retirement board seat to have
a diﬀering impact on the predecessor’s incentives, the private benefits have
to be suﬃciently high so as to motivate the predecessor to act but not too
lucrative so that the control over the selection process of the successor loses
its relevance.
4.5 Comparative statics
Now that I have derived the payoﬀs of the shareholders under the alternative
board structures, it is possible to analyze under which circumstances each of
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them is ideal from the viewpoint of the shareholders. The following propo-
sition summarizes the findings that arise from a simple comparison of the
shareholders’ payoﬀs in the equations (1), (2), (3) and (4).
Proposition 5 The ideal board structure is
• the fully management-controlled board when the restructuring gains are
low (i.e., τ = 0);
• the fully independent board when the predecessor’s ability to hire a bi-
ased successor is high (i.e., λ is large) and i) the restructuring gains
are high (i.e., R = 0), ii) the advisory potential of the independent
directors is high (i.e., aL = aH > 0) or iii) the role of mentoring or
on-the-job training is low (i.e., aL = aH = 0);
• the incumbent-controlled board when the predecessor’s ability to hire a
biased successor is low (i.e., λ is small) and i) the restructuring gains
are high (i.e., R = 0), ii) the advisory potential of the independent
directors is high (i.e., aL = aH > 0) or iii) the role of mentoring or
on-the-job training is low (i.e., aL = aH = 0);
• the ex-CEO-controlled board when the advisory role of the board is im-
portant and the advisory potential of the predecessor is high relative
to the independent directors but the ability of the predecessor to hire a
biased successor is large.
The first of these results is very intuitive. When the restructuring gains are
low, the project preferences of the shareholders and the predecessor become
aligned. What matters is to take advantage of the higher screening and
advisory potential of the predecessor. This then favors having the predecessor
on the board both before and after his retirement. One instance where close
involvement of the predecessor both in the selection and in the counseling of
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his successor could be expected is mature industries where the predecessor
has a long and successful history with the company.
The second result is also intuitive. Note first that, when the predecessor’s
ability to find a biased successor is high, the shareholders want to avoid giving
the predecessor any role in the selection phase of his successor. However,
when the restructuring gains are large or the added value that the predecessor
can bring to the counseling process of his successor is low (either because the
advisory potential of the independent directors is equally good or because the
advisory role of the board itself is insignificant), the shareholders do not either
want the predecessor to have any role on the board after his retirement. This
model then suggests that the shareholders should favor independent board
when there is an obvious successor candidate favored by the predecessor and
likely to share his project preferences (e.g., a long-term subordinate of the
predecessor) and i) the prospects of the firm look weak if a strategy similar
to the past one is continued, ii) the firm operates in developing, unstable
industry where fundamental reforms are needed promptly and the knowledge
of the predecessor may become out-dated easily, iii) the firm can attract and
hire qualified outside directors who are capable to guide the successor in the
restructuring of the firm or iv) the role of strategy- or project-specific advice
and knowledge is not important.
The third result, in turn, captures the idea that, when the predecessor’s
ability to hire a biased successor is low (or, alternatively, when the willing-
ness of the predecessor to hire a biased successor is low because career con-
cerns arising from factors like the predecessor’s desire to ensure additional
board seats are high), the shareholders may want to nominate the prede-
cessor to the board before his retirement so as to utilize the predecessor’s
greater screening ability but exclude him from the board after his retirement
so as to realize the restructuring gains (or, alternatively, the shareholders
may want to exclude the predecessor from the board after his retirement
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because his counseling ability and/or role is weak). High career concerns of
the predecessor could arise, for instance, in situations where the predecessor
withdraws from the leadership of highly visible firm and/or the predecessor
is still relatively young.
Finally, the shareholders prefer to exclude the predecessor from the board
before his retirement but to have him on the board after his retirement when
the likelihood that the predecessor hires a biased successor is high but the
advisory role of the board and the advisory potential of the predecessor are
significant. This then suggests that one could observe intimate involvement
of the predecessor in the counseling process of his successor in industries
and firms (like ones with strong and specific organization culture) where
mentoring and on-the-job training are important and the knowledge of the
predecessor does not get out-dated fast.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the role and structure of board in context of succession
process by using a framework where the board is responsible for three tasks:
selection of successor, monitoring of successor’s project choice, and provision
of advice to the successor. In this paper, the departing CEO has important
expertise that improves the board’s ability to first find a matching successor
and then to provide counseling to him. However, the departing CEO is
simultaneously also eager to interfere with the successor’s project choice so
as to assure access to private benefits. This paper then argues that, at which
point (if at all) and for how long the predecessor is nominated to the board,
can be used by the shareholders as a means to balance the benefits from
the predecessor’s expertise with the costs that arise from distorted project
choice.
In the main result of this paper, the shareholders’ willingness to involve
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the predecessor in decisions concerning his successor is derived as a function
of potential firm and industry characteristics. The results indicate, among
other things, that low restructuring gains (e.g., good firm performance) fa-
vor an early and prolonged nomination while high restructuring gains, the
availability of good outside directors and the low importance of mentoring
for the successor’s (and the firm’s) performance favor either an independent
board or an early but only a short-term nomination.
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APPENDIX:
The ex-CEO-controlled board: the derivation of suﬃcient firing
costs
If the predecessor doesn’t fire the successor chosen by the independent board,
the payoﬀ of the predecessor is
πPRE =
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
paH
¤
αR+(1− p) θLατ+p
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
aH
¤
b. (A1)
Firstly, the payoﬀ in (A1) has to be larger than the payoﬀ available for the
predecessor if he incurs the firing costs denoted by F so as to hire a biased
but more fitting successor:
πPRE > p
£
θH +
¡
1− θH
¢
aH
¤
(αR+ b)
+ (1− p) θH [λ (αR+ b) + (1− λ)α (R+ τ)]− c− F,
F > ∆θ
¡
1− paH
¢
αR+∆θ (1− p)ατ+∆θp
¡
1− aH
¢
b+θH (1− p)λ (b− ατ)−c ≡ F0.
Secondly, the payoﬀ in (A1) has to be larger than the payoﬀ available for the
predecessor if he incurs the firing costs so as to hire an equally fitting but
biased successor:
πPRE > p
£
θL +
¡
1− θL
¢
aH
¤
(αR+ b)
+ (1− p) θL [λ (αR+ b) + (1− λ)α (R+ τ)]− F,
F > θL (1− p)λ (b− ατ) ≡ F1.
The suﬃcient level of firing costs is then F > max {F0, F1}.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof of Proposition 4 requires finding an appropriate level of eﬀort cost c
so that the conditions c > max {c0, c1} and c < min {c0, c1} can be simulta-
neously satisfied. To facilitate the understanding of the proof, I first restate
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the conditions (C1), (C2), (D1) and (D2):
c > ∆θ
¡
1− paL
¢
α [R+ τ ] ≡ c0, (C1)
c > ∆θ
¡
1− paH
¢
αR+∆θ (1− p)ατ +∆θp
¡
1− aH
¢
b ≡ c1, (C2)
c < ∆θ
¡
1− paL
¢
α (R+ τ) +∆θ (1− p)λ (b− ατ) ≡ c0, (D1)
c < ∆θ
¡
1− paH
¢
αR+∆θ (1− p)ατ+∆θp
¡
1− aH
¢
b+∆θλ (1− p) (b− ατ) ≡ c1.
(D2)
I first compare the conditions (C1) and (C2) after which I proceed to the
comparison of (D1) and (D2). Finally, I draw together the results.
Comparison of (C1) and (C2):
The comparison between conditions (C1) and (C2) reveals that the former
is the stricter condition when b < ∆aαR+(1−a
L)ατ
1−aH ≡ b2. Together with the
condition b > ατ from assumption 1, it is then clear that, when ατ < b < b2,
the condition c > c0 is the relevant one and, when b > b2, the condition
c > c1 is the relevant one.
Comparison of (D1) and (D2):
The comparison between conditions (D1) and (D2) reveals that the former is
the stricter condition when b > ∆apαR+[p(1−a
L)+(1−∆θ)(1−p)λ]ατ
p(1−aH)+(1−∆θ)(1−p)λ ≡ b1. Together
with the condition b > ατ from assumption 1, it is then clear that, when
ατ < b < b1, the condition c < c1 is the relevant one and, when b > b1, the
condition c < c0 is the relevant one.
Comparison of (C1) and (C2) to (D1) and (D2):
Note first that b2 > b1. This then implies that i) when ατ < b < b1, the
condition c0 < c < c1 has to hold, ii) when b1 < b < b2, the condition
c0 < c < c0 has to hold and iii) when b > b2, the condition c1 < c < c0
has to hold. By looking at these, it is immediately clear that it is possible
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to find c so that c0 < c < c0 is satisfied. It then remains to show that it is
possible to find c so that c0 < c < c1 and c1 < c < c0 are satisfied. The first
of these requires the comparison of (C1) and (D2); the second requires the
comparison of (C2) and (D1).
The comparison of (C1) and (D2) reveals that c0 < c < c1 can be sat-
isfied when b > ∆apαR+[p(1−a
L)+(1−p)λ]ατ
p(1−aH)+(1−p)λ ≡ b0. The comparison of (C2)
and (D1) in turn reveals that c1 < c < c0 can be satisfied when b <
∆apαR+[p(1−aL)−(1−p)λ]ατ
p(1−aH)−(1−p)λ ≡ b3 (note that λ <
p(1−aH)
1−p ensures that both the
nominator and the denominator of b3 are positive). Finally, a comparison of
b0 to ατ and b1 and a comparison of b3 to b2 tells that b0 is larger than ατ
but smaller than b1 while b3 is larger than b2. This then allows me to draw
together the results.
Drawing together the results:
When ατ < b < b0, the level of private benefits is so low that the condition
c < c1 cannot be satisfied without simultaneously violating the condition
that c > c0; when b0 < b < b1, the necessary condition is c0 < c < c1 and it
can be satisfied; when b1 < b < b2, the necessary condition is c0 < c < c0 and
it can be satisfied; when b2 < b < b3, the necessary condition is c1 < c < c0
and it can be satisfied; finally, when b > b3, the level of private benefits is so
high that c > c1 cannot be satisfied without simultaneously violating c < c0.
Proposition 4 then follows directly when ones denotes b0 by b and b3 by b
and bears in mind that whether just a pre-retirement nomination is suﬃcient
to induce the predecessor to raise θ (or whether an extended nomination is
needed) depends also on the nature of the predecessor’s private benefits.
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